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“Images of Europe”, the title of the workshop from which this Working 
Paper originated, refers to the multiplicity of representations that “Europe” 
has historically offered. Today we seem to suffer from a dearth of images of 
Europe, especially in the symbolic field. However, this is less true than 
currently believed, because many symbols are implicit and many myths are 
just dormant, so that our researches can re-discover them and re-propose them 
to public attention. The essays which compose the present collection are 
contributions to the large effort which is needed in order to dig out and 
critically bring up to date the vast patrimony of images of the European 
heritage.
Among the contributors to this collection, both Anthony Pagden and 
Richard Waswo show how rich antiquity is of suggestions for our 
conceptualisation of the continent. Pagden starts from the dichotomies 
between European and non-European worlds, and finds in the development of 
technology and in real and imaginary travels, which accompanied the 
European expansion important means by which this separation was 
challenged. Pagden himself takes us on a vertiginous travel from antiquity to 
the present, showing that the distinction between Europeans and the others is 
by no means as clear-cut as it has been traditionally described. Waswo traces 
the transformation of the image of Europe from ancient Crete to the Euro as 
shifting from a “dark continent” -  as the etymological evidence which shaped 
the conceptualisation of the continent proposed by Herodotus seems to 
suggest -  to the “state of mind” required by the imminent unification of 
European currency. In Waswo’s understanding of this process, the Euro can 
produce unity, because money is itself a form of social assent, even if it will 
not diminish all other forms of cultural difference.
Jan Nederveen Pieterse further elaborates the question of the dichotomies 
between the Europeans and the others. He maintains that through the 
centuries, particularly the two last ones, Europe’s others were located 
primarily within Europe and otherness outside Europe was not necessarily as 
important as otherness within Europe. One impressive continuity in this 
history is the image of Islam, which has been Europe’s main other for so long. 
In Nederveen Pieterse’s words, no threat has compared to the threat of Islam 
and at the same time no civilisation has been as near to the European one. In 




























































































in the history of this concept, with the changes in the conceptualisation of 
identity, no longer conceived as fixed, and the growing concern with 
hybridity.
Ioanna Laliotou analyses the crystallisation of Balkanist discourses during 
the first decades of the twentieth century -  which rendered the Balkans into 
an anti-symbol of Europe -  and argues that the construction of the Balkans 
tends to harden in periods when domestic social debates are accentuated. 
Through case-studies which include reports of women travellers in the 
Balkans in the 1920s and 1930s, Laliotou shows how the Balkans functioned 
as a very significant “elsewhere” and played an important role in the 
elaboration of political visions aiming at social and cultural change and 
reform. She also proposes an interesting contrast between Europeanism and 
Americanism in the conceptualisation of the Balkans.
While these four contributions deal mainly with mental representations, the 
last one, by Sabine Poeschel, presents a series of visual images of Europe. In 
the course of the workshop, this paper was coupled with my own, which is 
not included here, but which I will briefly summarise for the sake of 
completeness. Traditionally, visual images of Europe follow two lines: one is 
the history of the allegory of the continent, figured as a majestic woman 
among her sisters representing the other continents; the other follows the 
tradition of the myth of Europa and the bull, the Phoenician princes who gave 
her name to the continent. The former field is presented here by Poeschel, 
whose essay offers a rich selection of prints, paintings, frescoes and 
sculptures from the middle ages to the eighteenth century, situating them in 
the iconographical tradition of the allegories of the continents; she analyses in 
particular the cycle of frescoes by Tiepolo in Wurtzburg. Poeschel remarks 
that the theme of the allegories of the continents evaporated abruptly just after 
its greatest diffusion towards the end of the eighteenth century, indeed after 
the triumphant frescoes in which Europe’s world-wide authority had been 
personified. With the American Declaration of Independence and the 
development of the Enlightenment, the theme lost its sense in European 
history and art, since Europe was no longer supreme and could no longer 
evoke its identity through this kind of images.
By contrast, the other visual tradition -  the representation of Europa and 
the bull -  has been very alive in the two last centuries. The paper I gave at the 
workshop focused on the period between the wars, when the distance between 
Europa and Europe was greatly reduced by the dramatic political events 
taking place in the continent. The sense of imminent tragedy induced various 
artists, among whom Max Beckmann and Jacques Lipchitz, to represent the 
confrontation between Europe and nazism in the form of the violent encounter 
between Europa and the bull, this last being interpreted as the bearer of the 




























































































allusion to the transition from matrilineal societies to patriarchy made it 
possible to interpret it not only in political terms, but also refers to the great 
socio-cultural transformations that Europe was undergoing in terms of 
women’s emancipation as well as of great changes in the customs related to 
marriage and sexuality. Later on, the two images of Europa and Europe 
separated again. However, even in very recent decades, the image of the myth 
has been revived more than once in order to represent the situation of the 
continent. If it can be argued that the revival of the myth is linked with 
situations of turmoil and anxiety over European identity, then the images 
connected with it can still have meaning for us today.
A first consideration is that the link between visual and mental images 
became very apparent during the workshop and from this Working Paper. The 
two influence each other, suggesting motives and accumulating meanings. At 
the same time, symbols and experiences intertwine, alternate, and are 
osmotically connected.
A second important consideration seems to stem out of these various 
approaches and points of view. All the contributors, in spite of trying to find 
continuities in the history of the representations of Europe and of the “others”, 
assume a fundamental discontinuity of history, which allows for radical 
changes and innovation. Therefore there is no European heritage from the past 
which can be taken for granted and considered as directly linked with the 
present. The recognition -  whether explicit or implicit -  of the discontinuity 
of history is a very important intellectual attitude, which excludes one of the 
pillars of Eurocentrism, i.e. the presumption of a continuing superiority and 
an uninterrupted inspiration in European history. Such claims are clearly 
unfounded, and the continuities must be placed against a background of deep 
changes and wide gaps. Some of the most interesting discussions that we had 
during the workshop -  such as the one on whether or not it is desirable to talk 
about genocide in South America using the first person “we” -  also showed 
the cultural changes which intervened in the attitudes of various generations 
of scholars towards the past and particularly towards European expansion. In 
fact, younger scholars felt that the detachment from that past makes it very 
problematic for them today to use the “we” that senior scholars use as a sign 
of accepting the responsibility of their heritage. This type of discussion is part 





























































































The workshop “Images of Europe”, which took place at Villa Schifanoia, 
EUI, on 26 and 27 November 1999, was organised with the help of Marina 
Nordera, whom I warmly thank for her careful work on that occasion as well 
as for her editing this Working Paper. I am also grateful to Sergio Amadei, 
who provided secretarial and administrative support for the workshop. 
Finally, I would like to thank Peter Becker and Hans Erich Boedeker who 






























































































Techne, Travel and Empire: the Non-European World in the 
construction of an Image of Europe
I could have called this talk something like ‘Forgetting Hegel’ for ever 
since Hegel wrote the passage on the slave/master relationship (shortly after 
the battle of Jena) in Chapter VI of the Phenomenology o f Spirit we have 
become accustomed to think of relationships, and subsequently, of identities 
into term of oppositions ‘slave and master’ ‘us’/them, us self/ ‘the other’ Let 
me remind you what Hegel claims, in Kojeve’s summary:
Man was bom and History began with the first Fight that ended in 
the appearance of a Master and a Slave. That is to say that Man -  at his 
origins is always either Master or Slave: and that true Man can exist 
only where there is a Master and a Slave. (If they are to be human, they 
must be at least two in number)... History stops at the moment when 
the difference, the opposition, between Master and Slave disappears.
Everything about our being, or selves, on this account depends on this 
relationship of conflict: the Master cannot exist without the Slave nor the 
Slave (as a Slave at least) without the master. Once the conflict is resolved 
history will be at an end.
Of course Hegel did not invent this opposition. The fact that it has been 
repeated in one form or another down the years through later Nietzsche or 
later still Kojeve, or a host of other commentators ending perhaps in Foucault, 
have made it so persuasive that it clearly resonates with some rather deeply 
held -  if not always very clearly thought through -  element of European 
rationality. Dichotomies of this kind have, furthermore, always been with us. 
The Greeks -  perhaps -  invented them (for Europe at least) and in the 
distinction between the Greek and the barbarian, we have a polarity which is 
isometrically analogous to Hegel’s slave master relationship. One which in 
our self-lacerating, post-colonial times, has been taken to be the defining 
feature of the European relationships with the non-European from Hellenistic 
Athens to -  lets us say -  at least the late 1960s.
But is this the whole story, or even the most powerful one? True we have 




























































































In this country they separate the Hellenic races from the rest as one, 
and to all the other races, which are countless in number and have no 
relation in blood or language to one another, they give the single name 
‘barbarian’; then because of this single name they think it a single 
species (Statesman, 262d).
And the belief that the Greeks looked upon all ‘others’ as barbarians, (i.e. 
persons incapable of true speech and thus of true logos) has, over the 
centuries, been evoked by even their most fervent admirers. As with most 
aspects of the cultural imagination, the distinction was never quite so simply, 
nor so stark as even Kant (who believed that it was responsible for the final 
collapse of Athenian democracy) imagined it to be. For one thing there is an 
empirical point. When the Greeks spoke of barbarians, they more often than 
not thought of Persians. Soft and soggy, effeminate and over-refined as the 
Spartans would have it perhaps; but hardly bereft of speech or true reason. 
And Aristotle who, in a highly influential passage in the Politics, goes so far 
as to suggest that the barbaroi might be slaves by nature had a great 
admiration for the Persian monarchy. Then Plato’s comments are not at all 
what they might seem. The Stranger is denouncing a certain kind of 
chauvinism -  racism -  what you will. But he is doing so in order to illustrate 
precisely what Plato takes to be a false dichotomy. Peoples cannot be so 
divided, any more, he goes on to say, than numbers can be divided into 2000 
and all the others. Human beings, in Plato’s view, should be divided into their 
only true dichotomy, that is male and female.
Then, briefly, thanks to the work of Francois Hartogh and others, it is 
becoming clearer that although there was amongst the Greeks -  as indeed 
amongst all peoples -  a certain suspicion of outsiders (and Plato was clearly 
alluding in his critique to a recognised false dichotomy), the characterisation 
of the ‘barbarian’ was never so rigid nor so wholly ‘other’ as it has been 
supposed.
I want, therefore, to offer a rather different story. It is one based on a 
different account of the place of travelling, of the technology which makes 
that possible, and of the domination which the uses of that technology 
necessary involves.
The Greeks had always been peoples on the move, poluplanes -  ‘extreme 
travellers’. The Odyssey is, after all, a poem about travel, about movement, 
about a man who lost his way. And there were other, better-documented, 
travellers. Pythagoras, for instance, who travelled from his native Samos to 
Egypt and Crete before settling in Croton, or, the first of the Greek 
geographers, Hecateus of Miletus who visited Egypt before Herodotus. And 




























































































which was to have a long history in European thought -  between travel 
(plane) and wisdom (sophia).
This knowledge of a wider world diminished the importance of race of 
genos as a means of distinguishing between the us and the them. So that Zeno 
of Citium the founder of the Stoic School, could declare that:
We should all live not in cities and demes, each distinguished by 
separate rules of justice, but should regard all men as fellow demesmen 
and fellow citizens; and that there should be one life and order as of a 
single flock feeding together on a common pasture.
It was beliefs like this, which led Isocrates in the 5th century to claim that 
being a Helene was no longer a matter of blood or racial origin, but one of 
culture and education.
Such cosmopolitanism was -  and largely remains -  an aristocratic luxury, 
the privilege of what the Stoics called ‘the wise’. But it is also a foundational 
element in European identity.
So, let us say that the desire to know ‘others’ to incorporate them -  if only 
as members of the same inhabited universe, the same oikos, as ourselves -  
and to subsume our differences in something greater than our own little 
worlds, to erase what Freud called ‘the narcissism of small differences’ which 
has sustained the other/self us/them distinction (and lies at the root of most 
forms of nationalism) is as much a part of Greek, and subsequently European 
culture, as the desire to ‘other’ to distance and alienate those we do not know 
or immediately understand.
This is not, of course, to suggest that the Greek -  or indeed nay other world 
-  was a wholly, or even largely relativistic one. Recognising the presence of 
‘others’ and their diversity does not mean recognising anything like an 
equality amongst them. For even if the Greek/barbarian cannot be made to 
hold as a distinction in the ancient world in the way it has been described, it 
remains the case that the Greeks did assume a dichotomy between the wise 
and the non-wise, between -  to use an anachronism -  the civilised and the 
non-civilised. Not all non-Greeks made ‘barbarians’ into non-beings. But true 
‘barbarians’ might nevertheless exist.
What characterised such peoples might be many things. Perhaps the best 
known of the non-Greek, non-men were the Cyclopes who eat a number of 
Odysseus’s crew before he escaped. They are cannibals, the supreme form of 
non-humanity. But they are also described as those who had no agriculture, 
lived in caves and -  crucially for me -  knew nothing of navigation.
For navigation, and the possibly for movement which it afforded became 




























































































to suit his needs. (The other -  which the Cyclopes also do not have — is, for 
similar reasons, agriculture.)
Techne -  or as we would say technology -  and what in Latin -  the other 
dominant language in our cognitive vocabulary -  was called, ars -  is the 
human capacity to transform the world according to human needs, the power 
to set in motion, a power which none besides humankind and the gods 
themselves possessed. “Art itself’, as the eighteenth-century Scottish social 
theorist Adam Ferguson was later to observe, “is natural to man... he is 
destined from the first age of his being to invent and to contrive”. Artificial 
worlds are as ‘natural’ to him as the mountains are for the bear. And, in 
rejecting Rousseau’s image of a pre-social, pre-technological state of nature -  
art had to be included in the description of ‘man’, as the claw was in the 
description of the tiger or the talon of the eagle.
Clearly those who are able to transform nature in this way are superior to 
those who are not, and as Horace said the power to harness the winds and 
‘furrow the Ocean’ while it might be the sources of much of man’s 
misfortunes, was also the reason for his greatness. In that curious collection of 
third-century texts known as the Corpus Hermeticum, supposedly the writings 
of the magus Hermes Trismegistus, whose wisdom was believed to pre-date 
even that of Moses, Hermes is shown at work imprisoning the demiurges in 
human bodies as a punishment for their attempt to rival the creativity of the 
Gods. Even as he does so, the figure of Sarcasm (Mornos) appears to 
congratulate him.
It is courageous thing you have done to have created man -  he mocks 
-  this being with curious eyes and a bragging tongue... For he will push 
his designing thoughts even to the limits of the earth. [These men] will 
extend their audacious busy hands even to the edge of the sea. They will 
cut down the forests, and will drive them [i.e. as ships] over the seas 
from bank to bank, all the way to those lands that are furthest away.
The classical conception of the origins of human technology, and of the 
link between technology and travel, was further complicated by the Christian 
concept of the Fall, for this entailed not merely a loss of God’s Grace, but also 
a loss of cognitive understanding. In the Garden of Eden Adam had been 
empowered to name all the works of creation because their properties had 
been fixed, and because he -  Adam -  knew what they were. In the altered 
world beyond Paradise, that knowledge had to be re-acquired within an 
environment in which ultimate causes -  as Newton insisted time and again -  
had been hidden and would, in all probability remain forever so. The Basle 
reformer, Simon Grynaeus, in the preface to one of the earliest attempts to 




























































































existence of America, the Novus orbis regionum ac insularum veteribus 
incognitarum of 1532 praised the new travellers for having recovered by their 
action the dominium over the natural world once enjoyed by Adam. 
Travelling into un-charted space had become, in the modem age in which 
Grynaeus was conscious of living, a manner of overcoming the cognitive 
damage inflicted by the Fall. The traveller, together with the geographer, the 
mathematician and the astronomer were Gods’ self-fashioning instruments for 
the subjugation of nature to man’s needs. For Grynaeus these are men (and 
they always are men -  Eve’s role is prompting Adam to make a bid for the 
knowledge reserved for God, the knowledge as the scholastics would say of 
first causes, precluded her from any role in scientia -  the human quest for the 
attainable understanding of secondary causes) whose mission is comparable, 
both in its nobility, and the distrust it aroused in the ignorant, to those -  the 
Saints -  who had similarly abandoned the settled known-world in order to 
seek the word of God. The new navigators, the desert fathers, even Christ and 
his Disciples, themselves, now share something of the same identity. Nearly 
a century later, the tirelessly punning English geographer, Samuel Purchas, 
also appropriated the legend of the expulsion from Eden as the source for the 
transformation of man’s condition from the stationary to the migratory. For 
mankind, “preferring the Creature to the Creator, and therefore is justly turned 
out of Paradise to wander, a Pilgrime over the world”, this act of divine 
retribution transformed for Purchas all human history -  including the story of 
Christ’s passion -  “the greatest of all peregrinations”, from God to man and 
back again -  into a narrative of human movement. In this narrative, too, the 
itinerant Evangelists whose task it was to spread the word throughout the 
world who, like Christ himself had no settled place, whose geography was 
eschatological rather than, real became the source of all foundation, human 
and divine. For, it was, of course, they who, finally ‘planted the Church and 
settled on her foundations’.
Movement for humans is natural, foundational, creative. It distinguishes us 
as much from other animals (who merely wander) as it does from the 
immobile or omniscient gods. To ensure that mankind fulfilled its place in the 
natural order, the Gods -  or later God -  had claimed Seneca, distributed their 
goods unequally over the surface of the globe so as to drive men to 
communicate with one another. As the fourth century Greek rhetorician, 
Libanius expressed it, “men might cultivate a social relationship because one 
would have need of the help of another”. Furthermore the Gods had been 
thoughtful enough to provide winds which blew in contrary direction so as to 
make sailing possible. Communication, the need for all the peoples of the 
world to know all the others became a dominant theme in most humanist 
discourses on the nature of humanity. In Cicero’s Somnium Scipionis, one of 




























































































anxiety about the limits of human space -  the Roman general Scipio 
Aemilianus is taken on a tour of the heavens by his adoptive grandfather 
Scipio Africanus, from which he is able also to gaze down upon the earth.
You see, says Africanus,
that the earth is inhabited in only a few portions, and those very 
small, while vast desserts lie between them... You see that the 
inhabitants are so widely separated that there can be no communication 
whatever among the different areas; and that some of the inhabitants 
live in parts of the earth that are oblique, transverse and sometimes 
directly opposite your own, from such you can expect nothing surely 
that is glory.
No communication was possible with the peoples who inhabited these 
other regions, which lay beyond the limits of the ‘orbis terrarum’ except in 
dream travel. For Cicero the lesson to be learned from Scipio’s dream had 
been the relatively futility of earthly fame. When, however, Macrobius in the 
fifth century wrote his Neo-platonic commentary on Scipio’s dream voyage, 
his concern, which would be repeated again and again as the European 
understanding of the world expanded, was that the human groups which 
inhabited the world lacked the ability for reciprocal communication, 
something which Macrobius at least seems to regarded as a violation of the 
human condition.
This sense that there existed peoples ‘out there’ of whom Europeans knew 
nothing, but who yet belonged to the same word, the same oikos as that 
inhabited by Europeans remained a source of anxiety, a perpetual threat to the 
perceived identity of the species. The Frenchman who asked Montesquieu’s 
fictional Persian traveller Rica, “Flow can one be a Persian” is assuming that 
there is something monstrous in simply being so unlike him. So, too, was 
François Vivez, the surgeon aboard one of Antoine de Bougainville’s ships, 
the Etoile, on his circumnavigation of the world between 1766 and 1769, 
when he remarked of the Tahitians that is was wonderful “that so charming a 
people can live so far from Europe”.
Not far beneath the surface of such opinions, however, was a serious 
theoretical point. To be human -  to be ‘charming’ as Vivez might say -  one 
has to communicate with one fellow being. One of the shocks of the discovery 
of both American and the Pacific islands, was the recognition that there could 
exist groups which were wholly isolated from one another (that is, been 
isolated from Europe). The whole Judaeo-Christian account of the creation 
and the peopling of the world had argued against such a possibility.
Oceanic navigation -  still an impossible conception for the Ancients -  had 
now replaced dream travel. In the narratives of the triumph of the origins of 




























































































given many beginnings. But most writers would point to three moments in 
which a new technology, a new ars, could be said to have resulted in the 
transformation of the understanding of the world: they were the discovery of 
America and the new sea-route to India, the invention of gunpowder and of 
the printing press. Each of these (except initially gunpowder -  but I shall 
come back to that) had two properties. They made Europeans more mobile, 
and they made them better able to communicate with one another, and 
increasingly with those whom they encountered in the worlds beyond their 
own.
Since these achievements had been limited to, and broadly shared by, those 
whom Samuel Purchas described as ‘we in the West’, they became a 
collective means of self-presentation, not, merely Portuguese or Spanish or 
later English and French, but in some broader sense, European. In 1559, the 
French savant, Louis Le Roy makes “the voice of our common mother 
Europe” declare “I who in the past hundred years have made so many 
discoveries, even things unknown to the ancients -  new seas, new lands, new 
species of men: with Spanish help I have found and conquered what amounts 
to a New World”. In Johannes Stradanus’ engraving of 1589 it is European 
science, here embodied by Amerigo Vespucci, which is shown literally 
drawing aside the curtains upon a new world of which neither Africa nor 
Asia, nor even Europe’s own, now sometimes dubious, ancient ancestors had 
had any knowledge. In Stradanus’ fanciful representation of the first moment 
of encounter between Old World and New, Vespucci, is shown with an 
astrolabe, the emblem of his empowering knowledge, in his hand. She, in 
recumbent allusion to Vespucci’s own image of the continent as an ever- 
available female, is raising herself naked from the long sleep of her ignorance.
From the early sixteenth to the late eighteenth century images of the four 
continents appeared in the most unlikely places as a reminder both of the 
newly-acquired vision of a vastly enlarged world, and of Europe’s triumph 
over so much of it, a triumph which only the sciences and the arts had made 
possible. Take one striking, but representative example. On the ceiling of the 
stairway hall of the Trappenhaus, the residence of the Prince Bishops of 
Wurzburg, a princely family in no way associated with trans-oceanic 
navigation, the great eighteenth-century Venetian artist Giambattista Tiepolo, 
depicted in lavish detail each of the four continents. These are so arranged 
that no matter where the viewer stands, Asia Africa and America can only be 
seen in relation to Europe. Here, too, Asia is marked by the exotic (the 
elephant) and the languorous, Africa (the crocodile) and America by the 
barbarous. Europe -  the only one of the allegorical female figures to be 
seated on a throne instead of an animal -  is given the attributes of the arts, of 
music and painting, of science and of the technology of warfare. Europe is, 




























































































as if -  as Svetlana Alpers and Michael Baxandall put it in their study of 
Tiepolo’s narrative orderings -  to look at Europe “one should look from 
Europe” for, “Asia, Africa and America are depicted in their relation to 
Europe. Europe is the rubric, the initial code”. This is why in Cesare Ripa’s 
Iconologia of 1603, a work which provided artists with a easy set of 
iconographic rules, instructs its readers to depict Europe wearing a crown, “to 
show that Europe has always been the leader and queen of the whole world”, 
which is how she appears in Sebastian Munster’s Cosmographia of 1588, a 
Queen.
Most prominent beneath Europe’s throne however is a canon. And the 
presence of gunpowder in the list of significant modem achievements ties, as 
does Grynaeus’ association of navigation with the recovery of dominium, 
travel and the knowledge it provided -  indeed all human technology -  to 
possession. (The various uses to which the world dominion itself was put, 
especially within the Roman juridical tradition makes this clear. For one may 
have equally dominium over a thing, as dominium over one’s own being, as 
dominium in some field of knowledge.)
The narratives of the progress of the European peoples could thus link the 
instruments of communicatio -  the compass and the book -  with that of 
political and territorial dominion -  with gunpowder and steel.
The association of art and sciences with movement and communication 
with possession is, like so many of our assumptions, an Ancient one. The best 
exemplar of this association of movement and travel with the quest for 
knowledge and the acquisition of power is the mythological figure of 
Alexander the Great. Already by the time Arrian in the first century wrote his 
history of Alexander’s life he had also become a figure possessed of an 
insatiable desire for knowledge, and incorrigible urge to travel. Alexander had 
been Aristotle’s pupil, and that it was for him that Aristotle had written not 
only what is, in effect, the first treatise on politics, but also one of the earliest 
studies of astronomy, the so-called De Caelo. In the Middle Ages Alexander 
became a voracious legendary figure whose desire to enslave the entire world 
is matched only by his ambition to know all its secrets and visit all its parts, 
for which purposes he went in search of the hidden sources of the Nile, 
invented a diving bell to reach the floor of the ocean, and was carried upwards 
to Heaven in a great basket drawn by griffins. In Walter of Chatillon’s poem 
Alexandras he is described as “the prince who had called the earth too narrow 
and prepared armed throngs to lay open here secret parts” -  lines which run 
together in one erotic image, both the conqueror’s desire to possess and the 
scientist’s desire to know. This Alexander, like the figure of Ulysses, whom 
Dante meets in Hell (a figure who is given many of Alexander’s attributes) 





























































































To know a space, therefore, was to acquire dominium over it, first in the 
form of a map, or a description -  for exphrasis, too, has always conferred 
ownership -  a list of attributes, something which in Bruno Latour’s brilliant 
metaphor can be ‘made mobile’, and carried back to Europe. Later, reversing 
the direction of travel would follow the colonies, commerce and conversion. 
Giovanni Battista Ramusio, in his Discorso sopra il commercio delle spezie 
of 1547, referring to the vast, but yet unknown resources of the ‘Southern 
Continent’ (still in the mid sixteenth century a geographical fiction) claimed 
that the most admirable act which a great prince could perform would be “to 
get the men of our hemisphere to come to know those of the opposite 
hemisphere”. This he explained could easily to be carried out in the traditional 
manner first by voyages of exploration, then by “dispatching into diverse 
places of that hemisphere colonies and settlers. In the manner which the 
Romans did”.
But this again is not the whole story. I began by evoking Hegel. I wish to 
conclude by evoking Kant. I have tried to link three familiar but also 
problematical European discourses: travel (or communication), technology, or 
the ability to exploit or modify nature, and political dominion.
There is a moment in the sixteenth century when these converged in a 
critical way. In 1539, the Spanish theologian Francisco de Vitoria delivered a 
now celebrated lecture at the University of Salamanca with the title “On the 
American Indians.” He began with a question: “By what right (ius) were the 
barbarians subjected to Spanish rule?” This question carried with it a very 
large number of implications. It had of course been asked before, and 
answered in a number of conscious-saving ways. Vitoria’s approach, 
however, was different from his predecessors in one crucial respect. All 
mankind, he argued, possess as of nature what he called, “the right of natural 
partnership and communication” (naturalis societas et communicationis). 
This described a complex set of claims divided into five propositions. In 
principle, however, it is an allusion to the ancient right of hospitality, which 
Vitoria transformed from a Greek custom into a right under natural law. 
“Amongst all nations,” he wrote, “it is considered inhuman to treat travellers 
badly without some special cause, humane and dutiful to behave hospitably to 
strangers.”
In the beginning of the world -  he continued -  when all things were held in 
common, everyone was allowed to visit and travel through any land he 
wished. This right was clearly not taken away by the division of property 
(divisio rerum)\ it was never the intention of nations to prevent men’s free 
mutual intercourse with one another by its division.
The right to hospitality, and in particular to assistance in moments of 
danger is, of course, based upon a supposition of a common human identity. 




























































































behaviour of the Cyclops is anything to go by -  are unlikely to behave 
hospitably to you.
“Nature,” continued Vitoria, now quoting Roman law, “has decreed a 
certain kinship between men... Man is not a ‘wolf to his fellow men’ -  homo 
homini lupus -  as Ovid says, but a fellow.” This in turn brings with it an 
obligation to friendship, for “amity between men is part of the natural law.” 
On this basis, all men are compelled to live in a state of amicability with one 
another. Vitoria’s point is that a right to travel peacefully and to be granted 
hospitality is precisely a right in the creation of civil society. It was, he insists, 
“never the intention of nations to prevent men’s free mutual intercourse with 
one another.” On these grounds, neither have the Spaniards any right to 
‘conqueror’ America nor do the Indians possess the right to deny them free 
and peaceful access to their lands. The same law which obliges the Indians to 
allow the Spaniards peaceful access to their lands, also obliges the French not 
to “prevent the Spaniards from travelling to or even living in France and vice 
versa.” It was this law which ultimately made understanding between peoples 
possible, for although there might exist many different kinds of peoples with 
many different degrees of civilisation (Vitoria, however denied the possibility 
of the existence of true ‘barbarians’), “the whole world ... is in a sense a 
commonwealth.”
Vitoria’s ‘right of natural partnership and communication’ was to have a 
long history. It passes through Grotius and Serafim de Freitas (and John 
Selden and Paolo Sarpi’s) disputes over whether or not the ocean could be 
subject to property rights, through Christian Wolff’s notion of a world state, 
what he called the civitas maxima whose purpose was “the promotion of the 
common good by its combined powers”, through what the Swiss diplomat 
Emeric de Vattel in 1758 called the “ties of the universal society which nature 
has established among men,” and which were based “solely on the quality of 
mankind” qua species -  until it finally comes to rest in Kant’s Perpetual 
Peace, a Philosophical Sketch (1795).
Here Kant sketches out the basic conditions of what he calls (and discusses 
at length in a number of writings) the cosmopolitan right, the ius 
cosmopoliticum. This right is restricted to what he calls the “conditions of 
universal hospitality.” Kant is quite specific about what he understands by 
“hospitality.” It is, as it had been for Vitoria, the ancient right of all persons to 
be allowed free access to any part of the world. All citizens thus have the right 
“to try to establish community with all and, to this end, to visit all regions of 
the world”. Visit, however not entail settling among, much less conquering, 




























































































it possible for [strangers] to enter into relations with the native 
inhabitants. In this way, continents distant from each other can enter 
into peaceful mutual relations which may eventually be regulated by 
public laws, thus bringing the human race nearer and nearer to a 
cosmopolitan existence.
This, however, is contrasted sharply with
the inhospitable conduct of the civilised states of our continent, 
especially the commercial states, [in] the injustice which they display in 
visiting foreign countries and peoples (which in their case is the same 
as conquering them).
Once, on the other hand, free access to all for the purpose of 
communication (and trade which in the Kantian calculus plays much the same 
social and political role) has been established across the globe, then a state 
will have been reached in which “The peoples of the earth have thus entered 
in varying degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to the 
point where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere”. 
Only within a “confederation of peoples” will it be possible for mankind to be 
a once both a citizen of a nation and a full member of the society of the 
citizens of the world”. “This,” he added, “is the most sublime idea which a 
man may conceive of his destiny”.
Kant was reformulating the older international order of competing 
European states and their overseas empires as a single cosmopolitan 
federation. But, as he says again and again, the image of a higher political 
order to which, in time, all societies come to acquire “an archetype, in order 
to bring the legal constitution of mankind nearer to its greatest possible 
perfection” was, not a “constitutive” principle, but rather regulative one, 
which demands only that “we yield generously to the cosmopolitan society as 
the destiny of the human race”. It is, also of course, still a condition of future 
time, and “unreachable idea”, but this fact could not negate its validity, “for 
no-one can or ought to decide what the highest degree may be at which 
mankind may have to stop progressing, and hence how wide a gap may still of 
necessity remain between the idea and its execution”. And “Even one single 
example can be sufficient sign in the course of events that it [a republic 
constitution] must happen one day. One cannot foresee that it will be 
accomplished, but only that [men] will try it so often that it must eventually 
be realised”.
It was, of course, never realised. The wise were never wise enough and the 
signs, as it turned out, pointed in other, more sinister directions. By the mid­
nineteenth century, any such alliance of states had become unimaginable, and 




























































































vanished, even as an inspiration. The great nineteenth-century empires, 
although they employed Roman rhetoric and Roman architectural styles, were 
the creations not of peoples but of nation-states and as far from Roman 
ecumenism as they were from Stoic universalism. But for all that there 
remained the possibility of a language -  which is now being used in different 
ways in the new increasingly multicultural states of which Europe is 
composed -  which attempts to dissolve the slave/master, self/other 
distinctions on which so much of the debate over the identity of Europe has 
been based in favour of one which sees Europe as but one part, however 
distinct and however triumphant in ways which have been noxious for many 
of the other inhabitants of the globe, of some large human grouping. As 
Montesquieu -  always a reliable guide in these matters -  confided to his 
notebook
If I know of anything advantageous to my family, but not to my 
country, I should try to forget it. If I know of anything advantageous to 
my country but which was prejudicial to Europe and to the human race 





























































































Europe: From Dark Continent to the State of Mind
I. The ancient world
The first image we have of Europe from the ancient Greeks who named it 
is rather ironic, in the light of what it later became. As the image will be 
altered and displaced, so the geographical orientation of Europe’s place on the 
planet has never ceased to be somewhat confused. This for the good reason 
that all categories, divisions, and meanings are relational: they demarcate 
something from something else; they depend upon contrast and difference 
(the terms of which are constantly being changed in the course of history). 
But the people who wish and need the demarcations are likely to be those 
positioned on some border or other, feeling themselves situated somehow 
between or among competing interests or attitudes. Such a borderline 
position could, of course, also be a central one -  as it certainly was for the 
Greeks.
The (now fragmentary) two books of the earliest surviving geographer, 
Hecataeus (an older contemporary of Herodotus), were called simply 
‘Europe’ and ‘Asia.’ The central point of the island of the known world 
(surrounded by the ocean, which flowed into the Mediterranean from the west 
and into the Caspian from the east) was Delphi, home of Apollo's oracle. 
Europe was the whole landmass to the north, from Celts in the west to 
Scythians in the east, and Asia the landmass to the south, from Libyans in the 
west to Indians in the east. These landmasses divide at the Dardanelles and 
the Caucasus, both pictured as north/south separations. It is interesting to 
observe that this earliest division of North from South has, of course, regained 
currency today -  but the terms are now those of economic and political 
disparity, not those of circular and geographic symmetry. Hecataeus' world 
picture was simply further divided by Herodotus (4.42): Europe remained the 
denomination for everything north; but the south was divided at the Nile, to 
produce Libya in the west and Asia in the east. Herodotus confesses to some 
puzzlement about how the ‘single earth’ in these portions received the names 
of three women. Libya, according to the Greeks, was the name of someone 
from that part, as was Asia, wife of Prometheus. But the only candidate for 
Europa — the Tyrian who was abducted to Crete -  is unsatisfactory by these 
criteria: she herself was Asian and never set foot in Europe. Herodotus 




























































































observe that the center is itself a borderline: Crete isn’t yet Europe, which 
seems to commence, according to one commentator (Sayce 1883, on 1.2), on 
the Theban plains, to extend limitlessly north, east, and west, ‘incomparably 
wider’ than the other two, as Herodotus put it (4.42).
The huge extent he attributed to Europe did not, of course, survive in the 
usage that soon became customary and lasted, more or less, until the end of 
the Middle Ages. The mappae mundi sanctioned by Christianity appear 
mostly to derive from that of Eratosthenes, a sage at the Alexandrian library 
in the late third century B.C. Here the main dividing line becomes, perhaps 
for the first time, east/west, along the Nile as before, but now continuing 
through the Dardanelles, the Black Sea, and indefinitely north along the 
Tanais River (the Don). The huge portion east of this line is Asia; the 
Southwest comer is Libya and the Northwest Europe. The shape of this map, 
simplified, and rotated so that east is at the top, is that of a T inscribed in an 
O, well known to medievalists as the TO diagram, in which the three 
continents have their definitive names (Africa replaces Libya) and are 
assigned to the three sons of Noah, Japheth, Ham, and Shem. In some of 
these diagrams, the cross of the T can be placed in the center of the circular 
world and labelled Jerusalem. Yet once again, the center thus becomes even 
more visibly a borderline, a tripartite crossroads.
One modem historian of ancient geography (Ninck 1945) reminds us that 
most of these pioneer geographers -  and ethnographers as well -  came from 
Ionian or Dorian seacoast settlements around the Mediterranean: Hecataeus 
from Miletus, Herodotus from Halicarnassus, Eratosthenes from Cyrene. 
(The historian of course has a small axe to grind: he is Swiss, and argues that 
true scientific curiosity is the natural outgrowth of a mercantile, trading 
culture.) Linguistically and culturally, all the pioneers were Greek; but the 
places where they grew up were on the other continents, unattached, unlike 
the Greek mainland, to Europe. On their literal borders they faced alien 
threats, which, in the case of Herodotus, became the primary subject of his 
investigations.
He begins his Histories by reviewing the causes of hostility between 
Greeks and Persians, who are of course his most significant ‘others’, and 
whose viewpoint he often labours to share and to dramatise. The review 
consists of myths, euhemerized into history and political allegory. Europa, 
however perplexing as a toponym, plays an early role in a chain of events that 
will result in the cataclysmic confrontation between Asia and Europe that 
Herodotus will chronicle. The abduction of Europa from Tyre by Cretans 
(not the white bull) offended the Phoenicians, but was only revenge for their 
(and not Hera) having ravished Io to Egypt. The Greeks’ second offence was 
Jason’s rape of Medea from Colchis, revenged in its turn by Alexander’s of 




























































































reporting the Persian view. But now, by destroying Troy on this pretext, the 
Greeks become guilty of making full-scale war in Asia before any Asians 
attacked Europe. [The Persians find the pretext of kidnapping women an 
inadequate cause of war, ‘since it is obvious that they would never be 
kidnapped if they themselves did not wish it.’] Hence the Persian enmity to 
all Greek incursions and settlements in Asia, which is their hegemonic 
territory, as opposed to Europe (1.2-4).
So here is the crucial geographical/cultural division (which we still employ 
and) which structures the subsequent campaigns and ambitions of Xerxes: the 
Hellespont and the Bosphorus divide Europe, the West, from Asia, the East. 
But we shouldn’t quite yet forget the ‘incomparably wider’ extent that 
Herodotus assigns to Europe -  it also includes the northern (coast of the Black 
Sea) realm of the Scythians, and everything west and east of that. The 
Scythians, of course, are the other significant ‘others’ in Herodotus’ narrative 
(Bk. 4), and the farther north you go, the worse they get. On the 
immemorially ancient scale of civilised beings (it appears formulaically in the 
Odyssey), which descends from settled 'grain-eating men’ to barbarous meat- 
eating nomads, the Scythians cover the range: the southernmost grow grain to 
eat, their northern neighbours only to sell, and the last not at all. North of 
them are, of course, the avOpOOTO^ayat, who have “the crudest customs in 
the world, know no justice and no law and are the only ones who eat human 
flesh”. Cannibalism, usually accompanied by incest, are what the ancient 
Mediterranean imagination attributed to the inhabitants of unknown spaces, 
the dark margins of the circular world. In the late 4th century B.C., Pytheas, a 
native of Massalia, sailed to Cornwall to acquire information about its tin 
mines, and reported that the people who lived in Ireland ate their own fathers 
and fornicated with their mothers and daughters (Ninck, 219). These spaces, 
too, were Europe to Herodotus, and they vaguely began around the Crimea, 
which in Roman times acquired the name of Cimmeria -  proverbial since the 
Odyssey for dwellers in darkness.
With help from the researches of the Swiss historian, we may now make a 
guess at the solution of what perplexed Herodotus about the name of his 
enormous continent. For the Tyrian maiden captivated by the white bull was 
but one incarnation of her namesake: Europa was also 1) a name for Hera, 2) 
a daughter of Ocean, 3) a name for Demeter in Boeotia (where near Thebes 
Zeus once hid her in a cave, according to Pausanias). Towns in Macedonia 
and Syria and a river in Thessaly were named eupamoa (Ninck 15-17). The 
word itself appears to come from eopcuo -  dark mould or decay, or such a 
colour. Eupcoeia is a Homeric word for the dark earth-depths of Hades; 
Pindar uses eupamia as an adjective for ‘dark, Sophocles and Euripides as a 
noun both for ‘darkness’ and the continent. In all her incarnations, Europa is 




























































































Demeter/Gaia, the earth goddess who mates with the sky-god to become 
fertile (Ninck, 18-20). A Cretan coin (V century) nicely fuses the images of 
the Boeotian cult of Demeter/Europa with those of the kidnapping story: the 
bull appears on one side; on the other is the lady sitting in a tree with an eagle 
in her lap (Zeus, naturally, much in the manner of Leda’s swan). The tree is a 
willow, which grows around springs, and was associated with Europa in 
Arcadia (Ninck, 20-21). Although Herodotus seems unaware of Europa as 
earth-mother on the Greek mainland, his narrative preserves traces of the 
continent’s reputation for fertility, as when the chief Persian strategist 
approves Xerxes’ plans to attack Athens not merely for vengeance, but in 
order to possess the extensive orchards of ‘Europe’ (7.5). Journey on or led by 
a beast is a typical Mediterranean island foundation story -  Europa’s sons 
were Minos and Radamanthus -  so Corsica; a cow leads Cadmus to site of 
Thebes (so Juno’s sow indicated Alba Longa to Aeneas); Boeotia meant ‘land 
of cattle’ (Ninck, 21-22).
So: from the dark depths of the fertile earth that produces the agriculture 
that makes cities, hence civilisation, possible, to the dark margins of all those 
vast northern spaces where no society or law exist because people eat each 
other -  all this is ‘Europe’ to Herodotus. And all of it remains Europe, even 
when confined to the Northwest quadrant of the circular world that 
constituted its picture for the Middle Ages.
II. Europe and later ‘others’
This picture, we recall, was drawn by Eratosthenes and subsumed into the 
Roman, thence into the Christian world, apportioning the continents to the 
three sons of Noah. The division that made political sense to Herodotus 
(Greek west vs. Persian east) made very little to the administration of either 
the Roman Empire or the early Christian Churches. As divided by 
Constantine, both of these common administrations had their eastern and 
western portions, in which of course the Greek-speaking part became the east 
(rich and sophisticated, including Egypt) and the Latin-speaking the west 
(poor and rustic, including North Africa, west of Tripoli). The collectivity of 
the Mediterranean OiKOUpevr) during the long transition from late antiquity to 
the Middle Ages remained the crossroads of the three continents, none of 
which had more than a notional existence on the maps of scholars. The 
collectivity that came to matter most, after the fall of the Western Roman 
Empire, was forming as Christendom, itself divided as the old empire had 
been. This division, extant for four centuries, was ratified by the formal split 
between the eastern and western churches at the Synod of Frankfurt in 794. 
This, in turn, helped to make possible the crowning of Charlemagne as Holy 




























































































Byzantium, the Christian Greek east. The political division that mattered was 
between both and the lately arisen powers of Islam, containing which had 
weakened Byzantium to the point of permitting the separation of the churches 
and being unable to object to the crowning of an ‘emperor’ in Rome (Herrin, 
134, 477).
The short-lived ‘empire’ of the Franks did not include the Iberian 
Peninsula, nor Brittany, nor the British Isles, nor Scandinavia. These areas 
were but the periphery of Christendom in the west -  regardless of the crucial 
role of Irish and Northumbrian monks in the reimportation of classical and 
Christian learning to continental Europe -  as dark as they had been to the 
ancient Mediterranean center of the circular world. The Greek mainland itself 
was divided between Slavonic barbarians and the Byzantine Empire. Islamic 
Caliphates ruled from southern Spain across North Africa to Persia. The 
subsequent history of feudalism and the Crusades amply demonstrates the 
numerous divisions within western Christendom, and a fortiori the total lack 
of any coherent geographical or cognitive or emotional awareness of any 
entity called ‘Europe’.
Such awareness only began to develop, as Denys Hay pointed out forty 
years ago, in response to two new major challenges to Christendom: one 
political and military, the other geographical and metaphysical. Both were 
inaugurated by specific and famous events: the fall of Constantinople to the 
Ottoman Turks in 1453, and the discovery of some unknown landmass in the 
west by Columbus in 1492. The former was a cause of the latter: the closing 
of the overland trade routes to Asia obliged the maritime powers of Lisbon, 
Genoa, and Venice to seek alternative routes by sea. Columbus himself 
apparently died in the belief that what he had discovered were the Indies and 
Cathay. It would take a couple of generations to ascertain that the globe 
contained another hemisphere. But even by the latter half of the fifteenth 
century, something had occurred in Italy to give new currency to a very old 
story that provided a way of conceiving the inhabitants of Latin Christendom 
as related members of a single family. The occurrence was the revival and 
recovery and fetishization of classical texts called the Renaissance; the story 
was the legend of the descent from Troy, derived from the Aeneid, and 
hooked on to the biblical geographical genealogy commencing with the sons 
of Noah.
The merging of the sons of Troy with the sons of Japheth had been 
accomplished in medieval chronicles and genealogies, compiled by 
generations of monks usually elaborating on the universal chronologies of 
Eusebius, Jerome, Isidore et al. Between the seventh and thirteenth centuries, 
these chronicles had produced lineage for the Franks, the Britons, and 
numerous Italian city-states that found them all to be descended through 




























































































Iceland). The medieval texts, summarised by Prof. Hay, which I have 
analysed elsewhere in somewhat more detail (Waswo, chapters 6-9), did not, 
however, make much of the continental localisation of all these peoples. 
They are rather narratives of emigration and entitlement to a noble ancestry 
that lays claim to the possession of civilisation and its hallmark, the city: 
Noah and all the Trojan heroes neatly bring together the ancient Greek criteria 
-  Noah planted vineyards and taught his sons agriculture; Troy is the resultant 
and resonant symbol of the achieved civitas. The lack of any sense of a 
continental collectivity in all the versions of the medieval legend is 
exemplified by one episode in the emigration of the Trojan ancestors of the 
Franks. Their route is overland (unlike that of Brutus in the later, and more 
literal, take-over of the Aeneid’s plot by the historia brittonum), across Thrace 
and the Hungarian plain to the Rhine. At an earlier point in this journey, the 
Trojan remnant splits up, with one bunch continuing west under their 
eponymous leader, Francio or Francus, and the other remaining near the 
Danube (the geography is far from exact) under the likewise eponymous 
Torcoth or Turcoth. This fellow is of course the progenitor of the Turks -  
apparently for no better reason than that one of Virgil’s names for the Trojans 
was Teucri. That the Turks are happily regarded as the siblings of all the 
present local dynasties and populations situated between Britain and Bohemia 
makes clear that all these imaginative genealogies are motivated by something 
other than any sense of contiguous, actual, present community.
The first evocation of such a sense was a direct response to the Turkish 
conquest of Constantinople. Pius II (the humanist scholar Aeneas Sylvius 
Piccolomini), who became Pope in 1458, then wrote a politico-historical 
treatise called, tellingly, Europa, in which he dismissed the etymology (teucri 
= turks) as silly, and adduced ancient sources that claimed the origin of the 
Turks to be not Trojan, but Scythian (Heath, 455-57). He was also the first to 
use ‘european’ as an adjective -  in which form it became current in Italian, 
French, and English by the end of the sixteenth century (according to Hay, 86, 
106). For Pope Pius, Europe meant precisely Latin Christendom as 
threatened by the Turks, against whom he struggled long and vainly to 
persuade various princes to mount a Crusade. Hence the Turks had to be read 
out of the legend of descent from the civilised Trojans (now regarded as 
exclusively the ancestors of Europeans) and identified as bestial barbarians 
from the beginning. However appropriate this identification appeared in 
political and religious terms, the power of the old stories was such that it by 
no means created an immediate consensus among scholars, who continued 
arguing about it well into the next century. It remained popular to preserve 
the Turks as Trojans, and regard the fall of Constantinople as just revenge for 
the fall of Troy (Spencer). Those persuaded by the Pope that they were 




























































































subjection by Alexander the Great. The latter notion, of course, eventually 
prevailed as the power and territory of the Ottomans increased.
Meanwhile, the old stories were receiving new and popular embellishment 
from the fraudulent practice of the new philology, the Renaissance obsession 
with ancient texts. If you couldn’t find them, you could forge them. The two 
most famous forgers of extended Japhetic genealogies in the period were 
Annius of Viterbo (the papal theologian to Alexander VI) and Johannes 
Trithemius (Abbot of Sponheim). For very different reasons, each invented 
and printed around the turn of the XVI century collections of texts purporting 
to be those of ancient authorities (Chaldean for Annius, Saxon for 
Trithemius). Their particular purposes need not detain us, except to observe 
that the Turks are passed over in silence, and the focus firmly kept on the 
peoples of what was Europe to Pope Pius. Their texts were immediately 
disputed by other scholars, but Annius’s became widely diffused, abridged in 
vernacular translations, and provided the inspiration of a vernacular text by 
Jean Lemaire de Beiges that enjoyed similar popularity and spawned similar 
imitations. Lemaire’s triumphant conclusion to his (barely decipherable) 
demonstration that the Trojans, the French, and the Germans are all fraternal 
descendants of Japheth is a plea that the latter two unite to recapture their 
mutual Trojan heritage from the Turks (Lemaire, 473). The net effect of the 
Renaissance reinforcement of the legend was to have made it “possible to 
elaborate the Trojan origin of every European people, to account for the 
dispersion of the arts and sciences, and to provide an etymology of illustrious 
antiquity for every place name” (Hay, 108). Thus to see Europeans as one big 
family was the way in which the medieval legends derived from Virgil’s epic 
and the Bible were recycled to respond to a present threat.
The other present challenge was the newly revealed existence of places and 
peoples unknown to antiquity. One of the first recorded uses of ‘european’ in 
English (early XVII century) contrasts it, as ‘learned’, simply to ‘american’, 
as ‘ignorant’, -  meaning, of course (what that word meant until 1776), the 
native inhabitants of the new hemisphere. As this ‘new world’ began to be 
explored, conquered, and settled by Spain, Portugal, France, and England in 
the XVI century, geography suddenly became the one department of 
knowledge in which the modems were indisputably superior to the ancients. 
Proud allusions to this fact echo throughout the many collections of travel 
narratives, such as Haklyut’s. And, equally suddenly, the ‘west’ became this 
other hemisphere -  seen now from a Europe progressively less self-identified 
with the Trojans and more with the Romans, whose empire was the model of 
its own ambitions. These, of course, provided occasions for the vastly 
increased number of wars among the would-be imperial European powers, for 




























































































The trajectory of what Europeans were now identifying as their civilisation 
had always been from east to west, and now it simply continued on that path, 
making the old periphery the new center. From Troy to Rome to Troynovant 
(Brut’s name for the London he founded in the medieval chronicles and 
Geoffrey of Monmouth) to the twenty Troys that would later be founded in 
North America. This trajectory was well foretold by Dr. John Donne, the 
Dean of St. Paul’s Cathedral, in a famous sermon he preached in 1622 to the 
“Honorable Company of the Virginian Plantation,” in which he identifies 
investment in this colonial enterprise with the mission of the Apostles. His 
text is Acts, 1:8: “But yee shall receive power, after that the Holy Ghost is 
come upon you, and yee shall be witnesses unto me both in Jerusalem, and in 
all Judea, and in Samaria, and unto the uttermost part of the earth.” These 
words, says Donne, that Christ “spoke in the East, belong to us, who are to 
glorifie him in the West.” The glory of converting the heathen, Donne 
promises, will in due course also produce immense profits for the 
stockholders, whom he thus addresses in his conclusion: “You shall have 
made this Island, which is but as the Suburbs of the old world, a Bridge, a 
Gallery, to the new; to joyne all to that world that never shall grow old, the 
Kingdome of heaven” (Donne, 266, 280-81). The dark north-western edges 
of the old map, where ancient Greeks fantasised cannibalism and incest, were 
to become the center of the new, and were fantasising in their turn precisely 
the same enormities about the folks on the new western edge of the global 
world. The newly extreme western edge of this now spherical world merged, 
of course, with its eastern edge -  the Cathay that Columbus thought he had 
found, the Japan and the Indies where St. Francis Xavier led the first great 
Jesuit missionary effort. “West and East / In all flatt Maps... are one,” as 
Donne (who was fascinated by the new cartography) observed in a poem. 
And their inhabitants were one, too, in the fantasies inherited from the ancient 
world. St. Francis found the natives of the Moluccas to be barbarous and 
treacherous cannibals who were also guilty of sexual sins too abominable to 
describe in writing (St. Francis 179-80).
III. Europe and itself
So thanks to the Turks and the Indians of both west and east, Europe could 
now figure out pretty exactly where and what it was. It was the center, no 
longer of Christendom, but of ‘civilisation.’ This word, for the thinkers of the 
Enlightenment who first made it current -  Mirabeau, Montesquieu, Adam 
Ferguson -  and theorised it as the mastery of arts, sciences, technology, and 
manners, came into use in the mid-XVIII century (Staro, pp. 11-59), when the 
legend of Trojan descent had been expelled from veracious history because it 




























































































identifying with the characters in the legend, the culture-bringing Trojans, and 
now identified with the authors of it, the Romans, whose imperial takeovers 
they were competing with each other to re-enact (Waswo, chapter 13). The 
very formation of the new word, ‘civilisation,’ suggests the nature of the 
enactment and the process and clinches the Roman identification. It is 
derived from the transitive verb, ‘to civilise’ (Eng. 1601, Fr. 1568): not 
something that merely occurs, or that you can produce for yourself, but 
something that is done to you. The older English antonym to barbarity, 
‘civility’ -  attested since 1549 and preferred by Dr. Johnson to the newer term 
-  is simply a condition or state, suggesting nothing about how it is arrived at. 
‘Civilisation’, on the contrary, is imposed, transported from someone and 
somewhere else to the here and now. The word crystallises the significance 
of all the old legends about the emigration of the sons of Japheth and Troy: 
the translatio imperii et studii, the whole point of the journey. The Trojans 
imposed their dominion and culture on the Latins, and they became Rome; the 
Romans imposed theirs on Europeans, and they became in turn the Spanish, 
Portuguese, Dutch, French, and finally, the British Empires -  extending over 
the globe to the farthest west and east become one.
The center of the latter empire, Donne’s ‘bridge’ between old and new 
worlds, was not quite also the borderline that the ancient Greek center was. 
For London, after the founding of the Bank of England in 1694, was the 
center of a new sort of power undreamed of by the ancients: the power of 
finance, the control of global markets. This power flowed out, and profits and 
commodities flowed in. In the purely geographical sense, however, this 
center literally became a borderline in 1765, with the establishment by the 
Astronomer Royal of the zero meridian at Greenwich, used from then on by 
mariners, ratified by international convention in 1884, but only capitulated to 
by the French in 1911 (who had all the while insisted on Paris as the zero, 
giving positions corrected from and to Greenwich, so they could be 
understood). This convenience placed practically all of Europe in the east, 
and made the west the exclusive domain of the Americas. Cultural and 
political awareness, of course, has nothing to do with navigational 
calculations. When XVIII century Europeans understood themselves as the 
civilised center, it was still as the ‘west,’ with respect to where that 
civilisation ultimately came from (Periclean Athens replacing mythic Troy), 
and with respect to Asia, regarded as the vast and despotic ‘east’. The only 
ambiguity here was the place of Russia. Prof. Hay has concisely discussed 
how this was dealt with, resulting in the general XIX century consensus that 
‘Europe’ did indeed include Russia as far as the Ural Mountains (124-27).
North and South America at this point presented no problem at all -  not 
even after waves of colonial rebellions had produced new countries on those 




























































































culture, however rustic, was the importation of all the Europeans who had 
settled them. They were but an extension of the European west, the last 
fulfilment of the translatio imperii et studii. There was even some European 
admiration for the energetic enactment of this model as the United States 
expanded itself across the entire continent. The model child, at this moment, 
was no sort of threat to its mentors. The anxieties of cultural inferiority were 
on the other side, since they are typically felt by the citizens of former 
colonies with respect to the European metropolis, which is usually happy to 
oblige with attitudes of great condescension. The former colony will 
desperately seek ways to assert its own cultural identity; its thinkers and 
artists will become obsessively concerned to find something unique that can 
distinguish it from its historical ancestor. American thought and writing went 
through this phase in the last half of the XIX century; Australia has been 
undergoing it in the XX.
Which brings us perilously close to now. Unchallenged as the radiating, 
imperial center of ‘western’ civilisation, Europe partitioned Africa in 1884 
and by the turn of this century controlled as proprietor or protectorate about 
85% of the surface of the planet (Said). What the imperial rivalries, which 
began in the XVI century, then produced were two global wars between 
coalitions of European powers, both of which required the somewhat reluctant 
intervention of the new western power, the United States, to bring to an end. 
The center thus pretty effectively exploded itself, resulting in what may one 
day be regarded as the major world historical event of longue durée in the XX 
century: decolonization -  precisely the undoing of what began with 
Columbus. After 1945, much of Europe was physically rubble. Politically it 
was, again, a borderline: the armed and disputed frontier between the newly 
dominant and opposing powers of the United States and Soviet Russia, which 
created a new east/west division within Europe itself. Culturally, it was . . . 
what? Exhausted? Discredited? Sort of -  but not quite, despite the loss, by 
death or emigration, of large numbers of cultural producers -  artists, 
scientists, professors, musicians, writers -  some of whom came back. But the 
very names given to the newly divided world in the era of the Cold War 
suggest the residual cultural hegemony now guaranteed by the inheritor, the 
last translation of the old dominion and learning: the U.S.A. along with 
‘western’ Europe split down the middle of Germany (plus the major nations in 
the British Commonwealth) was the ‘First’ World; the ‘Second’ was the 
Soviet Union and the now ‘eastern’ European nations in its control. All other 
nations became the ‘Third’ World that began to organise itself (at the 
Bandung Conference in 1955) simply as not belonging to the first two -  the 
“non-aligned” countries. Most recently, other peoples who do not consider 
that they belong to any country -  the surviving indigenous populations that 




























































































themselves (mostly on the Internet) as the ‘Fourth’ World. Some of these 
peoples, mainly in Canada, have neatly inverted the numerical hierarchy, 
holding assemblies (“Survival International Bulletin”, 1993) that label 
themselves the ‘First Nations’. But the hierarchy is clear enough, even 
though the Second World has lately ceased to exist, with its older and newer 
nations being absorbed into the First or Third. Moreover, the place of Russia 
in relation to Europe is now again as ambiguous as in the days of Peter the 
Great. When headlines trumpet Boris Yeltsin’s defiance of the ‘Occident’, 
it’s pretty clear he’s not a part of it.
Europe found itself after the Second World War in the position presciently 
foreseen by Alexis de Toqueville (in the 1820s) -  i.e. that borderline and 
battleground between the two great and contending powers of the US and 
Russia. De Toqueville foresaw only the political growth of their expanding 
continental empires, not the bitter opposition of their economic ideologies. 
With the success of Mao’s revolution in China inl949, this opposition was 
generally encoded as the capitalist west vs. the communist east. It is hard to 
avoid seeing in this geopolitical opposition an enlarged repetition of the 
Eurocentric Enlightenment estimate of its own civility as opposed to ‘Asian’ 
cruelty, backwardness, and despotism. There was, of course, a crucial 
difference: the power to preserve this civilisation no longer resided in Europe, 
but in its offspring and nuclear protector across the Atlantic. Serving its own 
interest, the US assumed the role of both military protector and civil 
reconstructor in the rebuilding of (what now counted as) Western Europe. 
The successful financing of the latter -  from Iceland to Turkey (welcome 
back to the Teucri under the auspices of NATO) -  was achieved by the 
European Recovery Program (the Marshall Plan, 1947-52). The shoe of 
cultural anxiety was now on the other foot: more than a few Europeans, 
especially the French, were tom between gratitude for and resentment against 
these forms of dependency on their younger sibling -  or child. Waves of anti- 
American protest and preachment broke out sporadically, and continue today 
-  the latest being the efforts of the French to curb American ‘cultural 
imperialism’ by limiting the importation of American films and TV programs 
(but what else can fill the untold hours of air time opened by the hundreds of 
cable channels distributed by satellites?).
But even at -  perhaps because of -  that moment of greatest dependency and 
disillusionment in the 1950s, Europe began to forge a more pragmatic idea of 
itself, “to turn the name for a region into a political programme” (Hay, 127). 
This is the concluding sentence of the second edition of Hay’s book on the 
emergence of the ‘idea’ of Europe, the first edition of which appeared in 
1957, along with many similar titles (Histoire de l ’idée européenne. The 
Uniting of Europe). What intellectuals then wished to imagine was in fact 




























































































communityoThe initial program, of course, was less political than economic, 
"'ttotks t o ^ e  wisdom of Monnet, Schuman, and Spaak, who began with a 
jSPSeific^bncrete, and therefore possible form of co-operation: the European 
'E^aPirtid Steel Community (1952), the success of which was soon enlarged 
into the European Economic Community (or Common Market, 1957), and 
only then expanded into politics proper, with the European Parliament (1962), 
and thence into the European Union that today is working to incorporate all 
the nations on the continent that were part of the former Second World. I 
cannot refrain from observing how the fringes on the map of the ancient 
circular world remain the fringes on this new one: the Northeast place of the 
Scythians, Russia, is still dark and ambiguous; the Northwest ‘suburbs,’ as 
Donne called them, the British Isles that were bridge, then center, are now 
marginal again, vexed and reluctant participants in what some call the 
‘Brussels Empire’.
The European Union was an idea whose time had come, and which was 
given time gradually to develop, and whose development was aided, as usual, 
by challenges from elsewhere. These, in the last half-century, as rightly 
perceived by the likes of Monnet and Spaak, continue to be economic. 
Organising the economy of Europe to both cooperate and compete with those 
of its former benefactor, the US, and its new rival, Japan, was the pragmatic 
task that may yet produce a continent unified in unprecedented ways. Its 
economic success can in part be measured by the need lately felt by the 
United States to enlarge its hegemony over its own hemisphere by the (not 
uncontroversial) creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Or, 
more concretely, by the fact that Airbus, the European consortium, has sold 
passenger aircraft to the extent that has obliged Boeing, the virtual monopolist 
of this market since its absorption or obliteration of American competitors 
[McDonnell-Douglas; the demise of Lockheed], to reduce production (and lay 
off 20,000 employees, “Economist”, 15 Nov.). The creation of such common 
enterprises (like the satellite program and CERN) in the last generation has in 
fact made Europe more of a coherent place than ever it was before.
With the advent of de facto coherence created by economic competition, 
also comes, however, a new form of cultural anxiety, now focused on the 
maintenance of cultural ‘identities’. Identitarian politics, I should judge, is 
one of the worst problems of the present moment: local or religious or gender 
or linguistic or racial or nationalist advocacies, all of which are terrified by 
the self-inflicted prospect of dissolution in some larger collectivity. The 
discourse that usually opposes such advocacies is no better (and certainly far 
less effective): that of universalist claims, principally those of ‘human rights’. 
The discourse of universalism, historically one of the major means by which 
the Europe of modernity asserted its claim to ‘civilise’ the planet, is not only 



























































































sterile, unable to stimulate, within Europe, any real motivation to create or 
conceive of identity on a continental scale. So the fallback position, 
interminably reiterated by well-meaning intellectuals and journalists of all 
kinds, is to a discourse of ‘tolerance’, of ‘respect for diversity’. So here is 
Europe today -  a state of mind considerably confused. Its contradictions were 
admirably expressed recently by a colleague of mine at Geneva, the current 
president of the Rencontres internationales, Prof. Georges Nivat. Asked by a 
reporter to name the “three major characteristics of European identity”, he 
replied, “Absolute diversity in a desire for unity, continual conflict, and the 
primacy of art” (CommUNIcation, 10/99). I shall refrain from unravelling 
the mysterious relations among these, but go on to cite his response to the 
next question, “When will Europe really be constructed?” “On the day”, he 
said (you should know that he is a professor of Russian), “when the obstinate 
mutual scorn between Catholic/Protestant and Orthodox Europe will be 
overcome -  then Europe will finally breathe with both its lungs”. In our long 
historical perspective, then, when Europe will become the united Christendom 
that it never, ever, was. This is nostalgia as mythic, as transparent, and as 
touching as that for our always already destroyed cultural ancestor in all the 
legends of the descent from Troy. I cannot refrain from observing that the 
day wished for by my colleague will not be tomorrow: when earlier this 
month the Pope celebrated a mass, attended by 10,000 people, in the capital of 
Georgia, the orthodox clergy of the country refused to come ("Le Temps", 
10.11.99).
What will be tomorrow I now venture to prophesy — or, less boldly, to 
interpret. For we know what will be tomorrow, that is, next year: the 
beginning of the circulation of what will become in 2002 the single currency 
of the EU, the Euro. The significance of this unprecedented enactment seems 
to me far greater than merely economic; it is also cultural, social, affective in 
the highest degree, because money itself is inextricably both material and 
symbolic. It is both the bottom line and the supreme fiction, the real and the 
imaginary at once. This is, alas, not my idea, but that of Georg Simmel (Die 
Philosophic des Geldes, 1907). Money can be anything, as Aristotle well 
knew; its nature is simply its use, and its use is established solely by social 
assent, the agreement so to use it, the credit and the trust that any human 
community may place in cows or cowries, in leather or in mulberry bark, in 
paper or in electronic traces on a piece of plastic or a screen. Money is 
therefore, as a system of exchange, precisely homologous to language: 
systems that depend on the establishment of totally arbitrary differences, 
phonetic or numerical, whose meanings or value are accepted by everyone. 
When Euros can be spent from Reykjavik to Athens, that’s what Europe will 
be. Grab people by their pocketbooks, their hearts and minds will follow: this 




























































































language -  never obliterates all other diversities. What individuals may wish 
to spend their money on or use their language for is not limited by the systems 
that enable them so to express themselves. And the more widely shared the 
system, the larger the community thus formed, the understanding audience, as 
it were, of those expressions. It is just because languages and money are, 
necessarily, the formers of community for their respective purposes, which 
are far from being all purposes, that I regard the terrors of losing diversity as 
baseless. Diversity and conflict will always be with us, as, notoriously, they 
are even within single families. These, indeed, have been the primal sources 
of hostility and violence from ancient Greek mythology to the majority of 
police calls -  for domestic disputes -  in the First World today.
So it may be logical to think that what the old fantasy of family kinship -  
the sons of Japheth and of Troy -  could not do for Europe, money can. Like 
nothing else, it can produce an omnipresent and geographical unity. At the 
simplest level, the Euro will make it possible for individuals to travel, to 
sample the diversities of their neighbours, without the monetary loss to the 
individual that always accompanies currency exchange -  or even credit-card 
payment. Following the wisdom of Monnet and Spaak, the EU is creating a 
concrete, specific, therefore possible form of unity in order that other forms 
may follow -  the envisioned ‘free’ movement of goods, persons, and services 
within the entire space thus monetarily defined. And the definition will be the 
more powerful and efficacious, I insist, because money is itself a form of 
social assent, an enabling fiction, already a part of ‘culture.’ And it will in no 
way diminish all other forms of cultural difference, any more than the dollar, 
or the rouble, or the yuan have extinguished diversity, or eliminated conflict, 
within the very large nations that use those currencies. So we don’t need to 
wait for the highly doubtful tomorrow when the orthodox churches will 
follow the Lutherans and the Catholics to the bargaining table; we don’t need 
to fear the loss of local identities and cultures. The real tomorrow will be here 
soon; it’s been painstakingly prepared; it’s on schedule; and it’s likely to 
produce a Europe that will be a more distinct reality than ever before. Europe 
will at long last be something definite -  and can then, perhaps, stop worrying 
about its ‘image’ and start exercising the forms of tolerance obviously 
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Europe and its Others
From time immemorial, peoples have considered themselves as ‘the people’ 
and all the rest as ‘others’. Familiar examples are the Greeks and the barbaroi, 
the Jews and the goyim, the Japanese and the gajjin, and China as the Middle 
Kingdom. Throughout, designating others and emphasising their ‘otherness’ 
has been fundamental to the construction of boundaries of identity and 
community, between and within societies. Over time, otherness has had many 
different meanings, as many as identity. It has referred to cultural differences 
along the lines of language, religion, civilisation, ‘race’, ethnicity, region, 
nationality, gender, age, and to class, development, ideology, and so forth.
‘Europe and its others’ is a sprawling theme that involves a variety of 
historically changing boundaries that share an element of ‘difference’. ‘Europe’ 
can be taken in two ways: within Europe, i.e. within what is now considered 
Europe, and in relation to Europe, i.e. problematising the identity of Europe. 
Both are considered here. While ‘Europe’ is an old concept it did not gain 
currency until the seventeenth century and, by and large, only became an active 
boundary as such in the course of the nineteenth century and particularly from 
the turn of the century. This treatment opens with a discussion of the different 
meanings of otherness in relation to Europe over time, including the role of 
Islam, and concludes with a brief theoretical reflection on otherness.
Europe
‘Otherness’ has many faces. Below is a schema of the different ways 
‘Europe and its others’ has been viewed over time and what kind of notions of 
difference and otherness it has given rise to. Several of these markers of 
difference have been around in one form or other for quite a long time. 
Obviously over time they have changed meaning and gone through several 
stages. Also they overlap and interact in several ways. In this schema 
differences outside Europe are juxtaposed to differences within Europe, 
considering that differences between Europe and others outside have not 
necessarily been more important than differences within Europe.
In medieval Europe, Christianity was the major marker of difference, 
internally and externally. The distinction between Christians and heathens and 
non-believers served as the main boundary between self and others. One of the 
root meanings of ‘pagan’ is peasant (paysan in French). This suggests that 




























































































difference between Christians and heathens ran within Europe. The distinction 
between Christians and Muslims and other faiths came later. Campaigns of 
conversion within Europe -  first aimed at the countryside and then at Ireland, 
the Frisians, Saxons, Slavs, etc. -  set the framework for the campaigns that 
were directed outward, such as the Reconquista of the Iberian Peninsula and 
the Crusades overseas. While the Crusades were directed against Islam, there 
were also Crusades within Europe. Internal Crusades were directed against 
dissident faiths -  such as the Cathars and the Bogomils -  and later against 
‘heretics’ and witches (Cohn 1975). The onset of the Crusades overseas also 
coincided with the persecution of Jews within Europe. Besides, within 
Christendom there were different centres of power: Greek Christianity centred 
in Constantinople and Latin Christianity centred in Rome.
Europe and its others over time
T im e B o u n d a rie s E x te rn a l d ifferen ces In te rn a l  d iffe ren ces
CE-
present
Religion Pagans, non-believers. 
Christianity vs. Islam and 
other religions.
Heathens. Heretics, witchcraft. 
Roman vs. Orthodox 




Race Race, language. Class, status. Nation, national 







Civilisation and savagery, 
evolution. Coloniser and 
colonised. Orientalism. 
Eurocentrism.







Developed/ advanced and 
underdeveloped/ less 
developed or developing 
countries
Uneven development within 





Europe European civilisation, 
identity, boundaries, 
Europeanness
Europe of multiple speeds. 
Tension between deepening 






Cultural difference Multiculturalism; cultural 





































































































Later a rift developed between Roman Catholicism and the Holy Roman 
Empire in Germany, the medieval power struggle between the Pope and the 
Emperor, which involved Cologne as a rival centre of faith and power. The 
subsequent divide between Catholicism and Protestantism (and further 
differences within Protestantism -  Calvinism, Lutheranism, Anabaptism, etc.) 
built on the old lines of demarcation that ran between the Roman Empire and 
the ‘savage tribes’ outside the empire. In the North, the dividing line was the 
Rhine. During the Renaissance, the distinction between ‘Ancients’ and 
‘Modems’ overlaid these differences.
This shows that ‘Europe’s others’ were located primarily within Europe. 
The contemporary perspective of ‘others’ as being located outside Europe, also 
retroactively, is a recent development of the last two hundred years, if only 
because the consciousness of Europeanness is recent. Secondly, otherness 
outside Europe was not necessarily as important as otherness within Europe, 
and was generally conceived along lines first developed in relation to Europe’s 
internal others. Thirdly, ‘otherness’ refers to a complex layer or web of 
differences that ramifies multidimensionally in many directions. If it is coded in 
cultural terms (in terms of religion, language or ethnicity), it also signifies 
geographical, historical, political, class and status, urban and rural differences, 
all mingling within a fluid mosaic. Fourthly, therefore it is not possible to 
produce a clear cognitive map of ‘others ’ because there is no stable or fixed 
notion of 'self that could inform this. There is no fixed point or ‘view from 
nowhere’ from which this can be conceptualised. The longer the period and the 
wider the geographical space taken into account the more difficult this 
becomes. Collective identities are stable enough to generate clear boundaries of 
difference only over brief periods. The mosaic of difference seems stable 
enough only in, say, fifty-year segments. Some differences may seem to be of 
longer duration, but if we examine them closely it turns out that over time their 
meaning or function changes radically, so that continuity is a superficial 
impression only. Let us develop some of these considerations further.
‘Europe’s others ’ were located primarily within Europe. Medieval 
Christianity was part of the foundation of the feudal Estates of nobles; clerics 
and peasants, each occupying their God-given place, like the caste system in 
India founded in Hinduism. Differences between Christians and heathens 
overlaid earlier lines of distinction that ran between the Roman Empire and its 
peripheries: the Pax Romana and the world outside. Regional differences in 
language, food, costume and customs were significant. In the hierarchy of 
Estates, ‘others’ were primarily those who did not fit in -  Jews, Gypsies, 
travellers, regional minorities such as the Marranos in southern Spain, heathens 
and non-believers. The real Other in the Christian world was the Devil -  




























































































difference was a metaphysical difference with moral ramifications and other 
differences were mirrored in this central difference -  identity and otherness 
were essentially measured in relation to God and the Devil. Gradually the 
emergence of burghers, merchants, and towns with rights began to undermine 
the feudal hierarchy and so did the development of monarchy and absolutist 
states.
Otherness outside Europe was not necessarily as important as otherness 
within Europe. Tales of strange beings outside Europe -  such as Herodotus’ 
tales of monstrous beings overseas -  were matched by tales of others within 
Europe, such as the ‘Wild Man’ and the ‘Green Man’. These figures were real 
enough considering that Europe until the eleventh century mostly consisted of 
forest and uncleared land, so much of Europe was unknown and mysterious. 
Pagan practices continued locally long after the imposition of Christianity. 
Crusader stories, Marco Polo’s tales of far-off civilisations, Montaigne’s 
observations on American Indians served as a backdrop of exotic differences in 
addition to those that were lived close-by. The invasions of the Huns and 
Mongols into Europe and the siege of Vienna by the Ottoman Turks were 
experienced as major threats, but if we compare the casualties of these conflicts 
with those of the Thirty Years War in Germany, they pale to insignificance. 
Even in later times of imperialism and colonialism, for all the talk of others -  
racism, Orientalism, the White Man’s Burden, etc. -  the main conflicts took 
place within Europe. The major wars -  the napoleonic wars, the Franco- 
German war, and the two world wars -  were largely European wars. 
Imperialism itself, at any rate the ‘new imperialism’ of the late-nineteenth 
century, can be understood as the extension of the European balance of power 
on the world map. Overseas conquests were a way of settling accounts with or 
keeping other European powers from gaining control -  the Dutch against the 
Spanish and the Portuguese, the French against the English, the English against 
Russia, etc. If we compare the numbers of casualties in the two world wars 
with those of the wars of colonialism and imperialism, then where were 
Europe’s others?
Otherness outside Europe was generally conceived along lines first 
developed in relation to or patterned by Europe's internal others. Thus, 
savages were discussed with quite different emphasis by Montaigne (the noble 
savage), Thomas Hobbes (among the savages life is brutish and short), Locke 
(all men are endowed with reason), Daniel Defoe (cannibals), Rousseau (the 
good savage) or the Romantic poets (paradise lost). In each instance these 
views were articulated with dramatically different domestic preoccupations and 
led to profoundly different conclusions (discussed in Nederveen Pieterse 1992: 
30-39).
The direct contact between Europe and Asia and the Americas set the stage 




























































































relation to Asia, the theme of civilisation came to the foreground: here were 
‘ancient civilisations’ that, so it appeared to nineteenth-century Europeans, had 
stagnated or declined to the level of barbarism. The way this was understood 
was modelled on the rise and decline of classical civilisations -  Greece, Rome 
and, further in the distance, Egypt and Mesopotamia. Gibbon’s account of the 
rise and decline of the Roman empire followed Tacitus, who had attributed the 
decline of the Romans to their mixing with different peoples and customs, 
whereas the Teutonic tribes had remained ‘pure’. This view later contributed to 
‘race’ thinking. If European civilisation was not to succumb to decadence and 
decay, and undergo the same fate as the classical and Asian civilisations, 
Europeans had to be on guard against mixing with different races and lower 
elements, for in any combination, the lower element would predominate. This 
applied primarily to aristocracies in Europe who had to keep their distance 
from the peasantry and lower classes. Thus in many ways, ‘race’ thinking 
started out as status anxiety on the part of aristocracies and upper classes in 
Europe, who at the time felt threatened and insecure because of the 
revolutionary changes at the turn of the eighteenth century.
In relation to the Americas, different tropes emerged. Cannibalism (a theme 
in Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe and stories about Captain Cook in the 
Pacific) was the flipside of the romantic paradise-lost image of life among the 
savages. During colonialism the accusation of cannibalism often served as a 
justification of conquest. Recently it has been argued that cannibalism is 
basically a myth: while ritual cannibalism (eating a small part of an enemy’s 
body for magical purposes) does occur, gustatory cannibalism (eating humans 
as food) has nowhere been observed (Arens 1979; Barker, Hulme, Iversen 
1998).
With the Enlightenment and its concern with scientific classification came 
attempts to classify humans based on ‘race’ and language. In the wake of the 
French Revolution nationhood became a defining element of identity. Through 
the nineteenth century, the notions of ‘race’, language and nationality mingled: 
nations were thought of as races (as in ‘Irish race’ or ‘German race’) and races 
were viewed as language groups. All along, otherness has been an ambivalent 
notion, a combination of attraction (paradise lost, the appeal of the exotic) and 
repulsion. Romantic preoccupation with the past and the unknown was yet 
another face of the Enlightenment. The pathos of the wild, the remote and the 
unknown may be interpreted as a secular version of pantheism or of the ‘hidden 
God’ (deus absconditus). ‘Others’ were embodiments of ideals (the noble or 
good savage), objects of desire, windows of mystery, or embodiments of fear 
(monsters, cannibals) and targets of hatred -  scapegoats, as in anti-Semitism 
and the pogroms. ‘Nothing but otherness killed the Jews.’ Genocide of 
indigenous peoples -  native Americans, Tasmanians, Armenians -  and 




























































































otherness. In nineteenth-century Orientalism and exoticism, all these attitudes 
are reflected, within a general setting of Western expansion, imperialism and 
colonialism.
For centuries, Europe’s main other has been the world of Islam. Defining 
episodes in European history -  Muslim domination of the Mediterranean 
during the early Middle Ages, the conquest of Spain, the Crusades, the fall of 
Constantinople, the siege of Vienna -  refer to Islam. No threat has compared 
to the threat of Islam and no civilisation has been as near either. Nowadays 
political Islam is often presented as the major outside challenge to Western 
hegemony. The world of Islam, unlike other challenges, encompasses a 
worldview, a way of life, a historical formation as well as a geographical 
space, stretching from Morocco to Southeast Asia. Its scope includes Islamic 
politics and law (Shari), Islamic geopolitics, Islamic economics and social 
policy, Islamic science, and Islamic identity and culture. To a varying extent 
these owe their present salience to government sponsored initiatives, which 
are made possible by rentier oil economies. Although perceptions and realities 
are difficult to disentangle, Islamism is a significant movement, which is at 
times presented as the most significant challenge to the hegemony of the West 
as Euro-America. The challenge of political Islam stems from civilisational 
legacies, anti-colonialism, anger and frustration about western double 
standards, and cultural disaffection. Ever since the Nahda (the nineteenth- 
century awakening or Renaissance in the Arab world), Islam has been 
repeatedly held up as an alternative to Western hegemony, at times under the 
heading of Arab unity. Benjamin Barber captured this under the heading of 
Jihad vs. McWorld (1996). It forms part of Samuel Huntington’s Clash of 
Civilisations.
But from hereon the story unravels. The real world of Islam is internally 
fractured; the umma is a delta of many streams -  Sunni and Shiite, clerical 
Islam, Sufism and folk Islam. The different forms of Islam in the Arab world, 
Iran and Turkey, South and Southeast Asia, Africa and Europe are each 
historically and culturally articulated. “Like other religions, Islam is not a 
generic essence, but a nominal entity that conjoins, by means of a name, a 
variety of societies, cultures, histories and polities” (Al-Azmeh 1993: 60). In 
addition, the distinctive character of Islamic institutions may be more a claim 
than a reality: what is ‘Islamic’ in Islamic science may be a matter of 
packaging rather than content. Just as Europe ignored or downplayed its 
dependence on Islamic and Arabic influences in earlier times, the current 
dependency of Islamic modernisation on Western technologies and examples 
tends to be downplayed in the Islamic world. Without a common opposition 
to the West, there might not be any umma politics, and what is there is largely 
political fiction. Part of political Islam is a critique of capitalism, which it 




























































































of an older, medieval political economy, in which ‘community’ values prevail 
over merely commercial and economic interests.
Development is another boundary of difference. This derives from earlier 
ideas of progress, viewed as a single-track path with less and more advanced 
peoples and civilisations. The eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment set 
forth a schema of evolutionary stages, from primitivism, savagery and 
barbarism to civilisation. These were combined with modes of production: 
hunters and gatherers, agriculture and crafts, and industrial society. The 
development gap only arose when the difference in technological capacity 
between Europe and non-western countries became significant -  from the 
turn of the eighteenth century onward, with the onset of industrialisation. 
Prior to that time, Europeans had looked up to other civilisations and been 
inspired by their example (see Nederveen Pieterse 1994). European 
chauvinism only dates from that period.
The difference between less developed, underdeveloped or backward 
societies and developed or advanced societies further corresponded with 
notions of ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’, the ‘Third World’, and later the 
difference between North and South. The imagery of backwardness or 
underdevelopment also applied to peripheral regions or slum areas within 
Europe. Initially development was looked at solely through Western eyes and 
modernisation was held to be the same as Westernisation. This biased view 
was subsequently identified as Eurocentrism, in which Europe stands for 
Euro-America (Amin 1989, Nederveen Pieterse and Parekh 1995).
In the course of time, Europe itself also began to function as a boundary of 
difference, first in the context of the tum-of-the-century ‘Pan’ movements 
(Pan Arabism, Pan Turkism, Pan Europe, etc.), and later after the war, in the 
context of the making of the European market. Which is more ‘European’, 
Northwest Europe or ‘Central Europe’? Are Turkey and Russia part of 
Europe? Is Europe part of Eurasia? The current tension between the 
deepening (further integration) or the widening (include East European 
countries and Turkey) of the European Union involves not only economic and 
security issues but also questions of identity and what constitutes 
‘Europeanness’.
In the European context, cultural difference is the latest boundary of 
difference. In the course of the sixties, racism gradually changed to the ‘new 
racism’ that focuses on, instead of phenotypic differences, cultural difference. 
In the context of globalisation with increasing communication, migration and 
travel, and as societies became increasingly mixed, the older ideas of race and 
civilisation became increasingly quaint. Within societies, there are many 
streams and flows of difference, such as differences in life style, sexual 
preference, age and class. Arguably two major differences remain. One is the 




























































































boundary of difference is the question of citizenship or legal status. Whether 
immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers obtain citizenship rights or whether 
they are clandestine and deprived from legal rights and social entitlements is a 
major dividing line. This relates to the image of ‘Fortress Europe’ and the 
realities of the Schengen and Dublin Accords. Through all these changes, 
ideas of others and what constitutes otherness have changed.
Otherness
‘Otherness’ has been discussed under many headings, such as prejudice, 
ethnocentrism and racism. The terminology of otherness derives from 
phenomenology and structuralist anthropology. The theme originates in 
philosophical queries about the nature of identity. Wherein lies the identity of a 
thing? Is the difference between same and other a matter of essence or 
existence? With Hegel, identity and difference refers to the antinomy of being 
and nothingness, which in turn refers to spirit and matter unfolding in history. 
What Hegel calls the life and death struggle with the other, for instance 
between master and slave, is a relationship that changes dialectically over time. 
Schopenhauer speaks of will and representation, Heidegger of Being and Time, 
Sartre of Being and Nothingness. Different queries yield various notions of 
otherness, such as the unthought, the implicit (Husserl), the virtual or 
unfulfdled possibilities (Herbert Marcuse). Psychoanalysis and the idea of the 
unconscious as ego’s other led to the theme of oneself as an other, which had 
also figured in Dostoevsky’s story of The Double and came back in Jung’s 
notion of the ‘shadow’. In his book / and Thou, Martin Buber addresses the 
other as a potential partner in dialogue. In a similar way, in the work of the 
philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, ‘alterity’ becomes a relational concept.
After the war, at the time of decolonisation when imperial identities were 
decentred, ‘the question of the Other’ became a critical and prominent theme. 
In structuralist anthropology, cultures were understood as a system of systems, 
a structural ensemble on the model of language. This approach uses binary 
schemas, such as naked and clothed, raw and cooked, and self and other. 
Claude Lévi-Strauss, the foremost representative of this approach, influenced 
Albert Memmi, Tzvetan Todorov (1984), Jean-Paul Sartre and others. A 
different turn came with Michel Foucault’s work on knowledge and discourse 
as the foundation of relations of power and domination (e.g. 1965). Foucault 
concentrated on those classified as deviant, criminal, heretic, insane or diseased 
in French society, who were subjected to regimes of ‘normalisation’ in medical 
and penal discourses and in prisons, hospitals or asylums. In Orientalism, 
Edward Said applied Foucault’s method of discourse analysis to the texts 
produced by European orientalists about the ‘Orient’, the colonized world 
(1978). In this view, the way others are represented in talk or discourse reflects 




























































































representation itself becomes a form of power. Foucault's poststructuralism 
broke with the idea of cultures as systemic structures and shifted attention to 
structures of knowledge within and across cultures instead. Jacques Derrida 
(1978) rephrases the question of otherness in terms of identity and difference, 
thereby returning it to the wider terrain of philosophical questioning where it 
had originated. In Derrida’s method of the deconstruction of texts, the 
disassembly of structures continues infinitesimally.
These influences -  idealist philosophy, phenomenology, structuralism, 
hermeneutics, poststructuralism, deconstruction -  are part of the broad stream 
of cultural and postcolonial studies that now examines how others are 
represented in discourse and images. The major axis of difference is the ‘Big 
Three’ of race, class and gender. Historically representations of racial (ethnic, 
national) others often overlap with those of women, children and lower class 
people. Representations of others have been analysed in relation to Europe 
(Barker et al 1985) and in the context of colonialism (Gidley 1992; Thomas 
1994) and race (Sardar, Nandy and Davis 1993), but the terms of analysis are 
changing. ‘The Other’ is increasingly left behind as too narrow and static a 
notion. There are so many different kinds of ‘others’ that there is little point in 
generalising about them. Besides, the ‘Self no longer represents a fixed 
identity, witness postmodern understandings of multiple identity and the 
‘decentring of the subject’. As the typical Enlightenment subject (who was 
white, male, middle aged, rational) is no longer being taken for granted as the 
centre and yardstick of the human universe, also its ‘other’ loses relevance and 
meaning. In sociology, cultural and gender studies, the terminology of 
difference increasingly takes the place of otherness. This terminology is more 
neutral and matter-of-fact and less historically burdened than that of otherness. 
Difference, of course, comes in many forms: as ontological difference, 
metaphysical difference, the difference of God, gender, class, geography, 
development, legal status, and cultural diversity. So cultural difference is but 
one type of difference among several and not necessarily the most salient or 
important difference. Another theme is the growing concern with hybridity, 
mixing, métissage. As societies become more diverse, intermarriage also 
increases, cultural differences are criss-crossing and in the process generating 
new identities and new differences. Cultural differences are eroding over time, 
due to globalisation, changing identities and consumption patterns, while local 
and regional reactions to globalisation are generating new identities and 
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Our Fellow Balkanoid Citizens:
Europe, Balkans and Visions of Social Change before WW II
In this paper I raise questions about the discursive constructions of the 
Balkans that emerged around the Balkan Wars and World War I and 
developed during the inter-war period. I am interested in relating these 
constructions of the Balkans to contemporary, i.e. early twentieth century 
images of Europeanness and modernity. The working hypotheses that I 
elaborate derive both from my own research as well as from readings in 
contemporary scholarship on Balkan imagology. Some of the questions that I 
raise have taken form in the context of on-going debates in the fields of post­
colonial studies and the wide area of research in the histories and cultures of 
the Near East and the Balkans. My intention here is to address the productive, 
although not always happy intersection between post-colonial studies and the 
emerging field of what we could call post-Ottoman studies.
My main suggestion is that the crystallisation of Balkanist discourses 
during the first decades of this century rendered the Balkans into a symbol of 
inherent volatility and in-betweens with both positive and negative 
connotations attached. I will argue that western [and by that I broadly mean 
Euro-American] constructions of the Balkans tend to crystallise and harden in 
periods when domestic social debates are accentuated.
By focusing on very selective examples of westerners’ writings on the 
Balkans in this period I want to suggest that in the beginning of the century 
this form of symbolism took a particular form: Balkanist discourses provided 
referents to western conceptualisations of societies of difference. For 
European intellectuals and political activists this question referred to the 
process of re-conceptualising nationalism and culture beyond imperialism. 
For American publicists and intellectuals, the question referred to organising 
society beyond the model of national assimilation.
Continental Names as Concept-Metaphors
From the point of view of the history of culture continental names (Europe, 
America, Asia, Africa etc.) operate as concept-metaphors that are used in 
order to refer to specific cultural, political and economic values.
This signifying operation however is only possible through the interrelation 




























































































acquired its signifying capacity via its relation to Europe. On the other hand 
the name “Europe” has acquired its signifying potential through multiple 
reliance to “Asia”, “Africa”, “America”. More importantly we could argue 
that the authoritative narratives of each of these names were written with 
reference to a global horizon, i.e. through (political, economic, geographic, 
and cultural) references to the “World”.
As Jacques Derrida has noted with respect to the naming of “Europe”,
From Hegel to Valéry, from Husserl to Heidegger, in spite of all the 
differences that distinguish these great examples from each other...the 
traditional discourse [on Europe] is already a discourse of the modem 
Western world. It dates, it is dated... It dates from a moment when 
Europe sees itself on the horizon, that is to say, from its end. This old 
discourse about Europe, a discourse at once exemplary and exemplarist, 
is already a traditional discourse o f modernity.'
Since within modernity difference is defined in a superiorist mode, the 
signifying capacity of continental names lies in their ability to represent 
different positions in the rich spectrum of shades that connect civilisation to 
barbarity.
Sub-continental names and the process of perpetual differentiation
In this process of cultural signification sub-continental names acquire a 
special importance. They are often used in order to suggest the perpetual 
internal differentiation of the continental names and their meaning and 
cultural properties. Often sub-continental names, e.g. the Balkans, are used in 
order to signify elements of self-identification that would be better eradicated 
from hegemonic narratives of culture and imagination. Elements that do not 
fit comfortably into hegemonic narratives of self-identification but persist and 
can never be successfully erased. These elements are projected on sub­
continental names, areas of culture and imagination that lie at the borders of 
the self, both ours as well as radically foreign.
The origin of the name of the Balkans is an example of this type of internal 
differentiation. The attribution of the name to the southeastern peninsula of 
Europe was actually a result of mis-naming. The term Balkan was apparently 
first used by the German geographer August Zeune in his book Gea published 1





























































































in Berlin in 1809.2 The name was chosen through the common geographic 
practice of naming a region after a prominent mountain range. The Balkan 
Mountains, now lying in Bulgaria and known as Stara Planina (Bulgarian for 
‘The Old Mountain’) were referred to in Antiquity as Haemus. However, the 
Turkish noun ‘balkan’, denoting a mountain chain was assumed by Western 
travellers to be the name of this specific range. The name itself was 
apparently the result of misunderstanding. Zeune’s naming was part of his 
effort to divide Europe into nine discrete geographical areas. The name of the 
Balkans was initially used very sporadically, but became widely accepted 
during the 1870s and 1880s, when it fulfilled a need for a short-hand 
reference for the new states crystallising in the territory previously known as 
‘Turkey in Europe’. A name was then needed in order to conceptualise a 
geographic as well as cultural and political area that had been part of the 
Muslim world, but not quite; part of Europe, but not quite; part of the 
European family of modem nation-states, but not quite. Without an easily 
definable borderline between the peninsula and ‘mainland Europe’, and the 
peninsula and Asia, disagreements about the exact territory of the Balkans 
have never been resolved.
Thus the name of the Balkans was introduced in order to refer to political 
and cultural phenomena of ambivalence concerning borders: where does Asia 
end? Where does Europe begin? The name also signified spatial and temporal 
spheres of cultural influence: when and where do Islamic (i.e. Ottoman) 
bearings on European soil end? When does Europe regain control over its 
cultural borderline?
Imagining the Balkans
During the last decade the ways in which the Balkans have been 
historically imagined by western Europeans have been studied by historians 
as well as literary critics. Under the impact of the recent wars in former 
Yugoslavia, the rise of nationalism in Southeastern Europe and the western 
European involvement in the conflict resolution efforts the issue of western 
perceptions of the Balkans has acquired renewed scholarly interest.
Moved by contemporary politics and inspired by readings of Edward Said’s 
Orientalism, leading scholars in the field of Balkan studies have undertaken a 
two-fold crusade:
2 On the history of the name see: Vesna Goldsworthy, Inventing Ruritania: the imperialism 




























































































a. To uncover the West’s misrepresentations of the Balkans and the ways in 
which these misrepresentations reflect racist intellectual and political 
attitudes.
b. To point-out what Said got wrong in his Orientalism
Maria Todorova’s book Imagining the Balkans is the most notable 
representative of this group of scholarship. Todorova describes the itinerary 
that images of the Balkans have followed in European imagination from the 
late eighteenth century to our times. She focuses on travellers’ literature as 
well as the work of journalists and publicists of a great variety.
Her basic thesis is that “Balkanism was formed gradually in the course of 
two centuries and crystallised in a specific discourse around the Balkan Wars. 
In the next decades, it gained some additional features but these were mostly a 
matter of detail, not of essence.”3 Another central point in her argument is the 
difference between Balkanism and Orientalism. Todorova argues that 
Balkanism evolved to a great extent independently from Orientalism and in 
certain aspects, against or despite it. The reasons for this distinction 
concerned the absence of colonial legacy in the Balkans, their Christian 
character and the emergence of multiple autonomous -  even though 
idiosyncratic -  Balkan identities that were “invariably erected against an 
oriental other.”4 Elaborating on this last point, she juxtaposes textual 
constructions of the Balkans in the West with Balkan self-constructions that 
developed mostly in the field of historiographical production -  a set of 
material that she uncharacteristically given the depth of her theoretical 
sensitivity refers to as the “de hors-texte” territory.5
Imagining the Balkans shares with other books that focus on constructions 
of the Balkans in Western Europe (mainly Britain) a common characteristic. 
They treat European constructions of the Balkans independently from 
European constructions of Europeanness. Indeed what connects Orientalism 
with Balkanism is the fact that they are respectively related to western 
processes of institutional and non-institutional production of knowledge.
Imagining the Balkans and Todorova’s wide knowledge of the literature 
takes us through a rich repertoire of European mostly derogatory 
conceptualisations of the Balkans as the land of violence and unrest. The
3 Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, New York, Oxford University Press, 1997.
4 Ibid., p. 20
5 I will not expand on the distinction between ‘text’ and ‘reality’ here. Suffice it to say that 
the particular application of this distinction in Imagining the Balkans is related to the 
author’s decision to let aside the fact that dis-identifying oneself from the negative 
connotations of the Orient has not been exclusively an element of Balkan identity 
construction. We can trace similar trends in the histories of other peoples often located 
within the Orient itself. In any case, Balkan dis-identification from the Orient has always 




























































































relation of this Balkanist imagination to European intellectual and cultural 
history however remains un-addressed. It is only in the finale [the actual last 
paragraph] that the author gives us a hint that she is actually aware of these 
interrelations and still in an uncanny way it is only through Orientalism that 
the author takes us from the Balkans back to Europe.
By being geographically inextricable from Europe, yet culturally 
constructed as the ‘other’ within, the Balkans have been able to 
absorb conveniently a number of externalised political, ideological, 
and cultural frustrations stemming from tensions and contradictions 
inherent to the regions and societies outside the Balkans. Balkanism 
became, in time, a convenient substitute for the emotional discharge 
that Orientalism provided, exempting the West from charges of 
racism, colonialism, Eurocentrism, and Christian intolerance against 
Islam. After all, the Balkans are in Europe, they are white; they are 
predominantly Christian, and therefore the extemalisation of 
frustrations on them can circumvent the usual racial or religious bias 
allegations. With the re-emergence of East and Orientalism as 
independent semantic values, the Balkans are left in Europe’s thrall, 
anticivilisation, alter ego, the dark side within.
Taking this last paragraph as a troubled starting-point, I want now to point 
to some venues of research that could allow us to see Balkanism as a 
repertoire of images and visions of Europe. There are few main points that 
this exploration ought to not underestimate.
- The first concerns the weight of the Ottoman as well as Eastern 
(Byzantine) legacy on western constructions of the Balkans. The interrelation 
among western Christianity, Greek Orthodoxy and Islam in terms of cultural 
signification and specificity cannot be reduced to a binary opposition.
- Attention should be given to the intellectual and social circles that were 
implicated to the construction of discourses on the Balkans and their distinct 
agendas.
- The different themes of Balkanism should be related to the overall major 
issues that determined emerging images of Europeanness in that penod: 
globalisation, the crisis of nineteenth century imperialism, war and social 
unrest and revolutions.
Let us now focus on two case studies that illustrate the intertwining among 
western views on the Balkans, modem forms of sociality and images of 
Europe. Although these two case studies are quite different from each other 
they both indicate how Balkanism overruns binary distinctions between 
derogatory/positive characterisations, progressive and conservative views, 




























































































Balkan culture were appropriated as useful elements for the envisioning of 
rejuvenated and positive images of Europe.
Case A:
Women in the Balkans and the search for a better European future
There is a long tradition of women travellers to the Near East ranging from 
19th century tourism to the resorts of Yugoslavia (Opatija and Bled) to 
twentieth century political activism and social work. Lured by the images of 
primitive Balkan character, political strife and primal devotion to national 
ideals -  images that were generated around the years of the Balkan Wars and 
World War I, a growing number of women, particularly British women, 
travelled in the Balkans and devoted long periods of their lives to the causes 
of national struggles in the area.
Altering the stereotypes of gentle-women travellers, women like Edith 
Durham, Rebecca West, Rose Wilder Lane and others chose the Balkans as an 
area of political activism, research, social work and military struggle, as in the 
case of Flora Sandes, an English woman who fought for seven years as an 
officer in the Serbian Army.6
Most of these women published articles, books, memoirs and fiction that 
recorded in various forms their experiences. This travel literature -  for lack 
of better word -  contributed greatly to the formation and propagation of 
images of the Balkans in Western Europe.
These writings are in general marked by the authors’ active desire to 
commit their lives to political activism often as a way out of the ‘dullness’ of 
middle-class women’s life in provincial England. The Balkans provided an 
open territory to political activism. Women like Edith Durham and Rebecca 
West were often criticised by the English press which often commented 
ironically on the modem ladies’ desire each to adopt a Balkan baby-state and 
devote themselves to its upbringing and well-being.
It would be very restricting to think of women’s travel writing of this 
period only in this sense. Their writings offer insights into a variety of themes 
that concern social and international politics, war and pacifism, gender 
relations and cultural interactions (east/west, Western Christianity/Eastem 
Orthodoxy/Islam)
Let us take the example of Rebecca West. This was the adopted name of 
Cecily Isabel Fairfield bom in 1892 in County Kerry of a Scottish mother and 
an Anglo-Irish journalist father. She wrote fiction, poetry, criticism and 
journalism. Invested in the cause of suffragetism, she contributed articles to
6 On women travelers in the Balkans, see John Allcock and Antonia Young (eds), Black 





























































































the Freewoman as well as socialist newspapers of the period. In 1912 she 
started a passionate love affair with science-fiction author and publicist H.G. 
Wells, an experience that was formative for her as a writer.
West’s love relationship with the Balkans developed in the 1930s, starting 
from a period of discovery, rising to a generous climax and followed by bitter 
post-war disillusionment. She travelled extensively in the European Near East 
and she wrote both fictional and non-fictional accounts of her experiences. 
Her most important work on the Balkans is her book. The book was first 
published in 1940, made reprints and it was until recently a necessary literary 
companion for the western traveller in the Balkans.
The book documents West’s return to Yugoslavia in 1937 after an earlier 
visit that made her fall in love with the country and its people. As she put it to 
her husband trying to persuade him to return to the Balkans after that first 
visit,
"Well, there is everything there. Except what we have. But that is 
little.” “Do you mean that the English have very little,” he asked, “or 
the whole of the West?” ‘The whole of the West,” I said, “here too.”
He looked at the butter-yellow baroque houses between the chestnut 
trees and laughed. “Beethoven and Mozart and Schubert wrote quite a 
lot of music in this town,” he said. “But they were none of them 
happy,” I objected. “In Yugoslavia,” suggested my husband smiling, 
“everybody is happy.” “No, no”, I said, “not at all, but...” The thing I 
wanted to tell him could not be told, however, because it was 
manifold and nothing like what one is accustomed to communicate 
with words. “Really...there is much we have not got which the 
people in the Balkans have got in quantity.”7
In the prologue of her book she mentions that all she knew about the 
Balkans prior to her first visit was violence, a knowledge derived from 
memories of her “earliest interest in Liberalism”. She notes:
But I must have been wholly mistaken in my acceptance of the 
popular legend regarding the Balkans, for if South Slavs had been 
truly violent they would not have been hated by the Austrians, who 
worshipped violence in an imperialist form, and later by the fascists, 
who worshipped violence in a totalitarian form. I had to admit that 
quite simply I knew nothing at all about the south-eastern comer of 
Europe; and since there proceeds steadily from that place a stream of
7 Rebecca West, Black Lamb and Grey Falkon. A Journey through Yugoslavia in 1937, 




























































































events which are source of danger to me... that is to say I know 
nothing of my destiny. That is a calamity.8
There are many ways to read into West’s Black Lamb and Grey Falkon. 
The title itself is highly symbolic. The symbolism concerns different acts of 
intercultural exchanges in the context of the Ottoman Empire. According to 
folk tradition the Black Lamb is offered by Gypsies to Christians at the Eve of 
St. George just before the Orthodox Easter. The Grey Falkon refers to the epic 
bird that appeared to Tsar Lazar before the battle between the Serbs and Turks 
at Kosovo in 1389 offering him the choice between an earthly and a heavenly 
kingdom. He chose the heavenly kingdom and consequently he lost his 
earthly one to the Turks.
The symbolic focus of the title instructs us to read the book as a lengthy 
(i.e. over a thousand pages long) elaboration on the issue of the fate of 
empires and position of subaltern cultures within imperial political structures.
West is an admirer of the newness and the vitality of nationalism in the 
Balkans. She confidently notes that “if there is an assurance in the Europe of 
our day that sometimes life goes well, a promise that some day it may go 
better, it is offered by these [new Balkan] countries”.
In the new Balkan states she sees the possibility of something new being 
created. New nation-states that do not share the faults of Empires and are 
formed in opposition to therfi. She exclaims at the fact that her contemporaries 
in Europe and the United States did not see that in the same way. She 
explicitly attacks people on the political left for the failure to recognise the 
people’s right to claim and fight for national independence. As she puts it,
The left wing, especially, was sharply critical of the new states and 
all that they did. This was inconsistent in those who believed, often to 
a point far beyond the practical, that the individual must be free to 
determine his own destiny, and it was partly due to a theory, so 
absurd that not even its direct opposite has any chance of being true, 
that nationalism is always anti-democratic and aggressive, and that 
internationalism is always liberal and pacific. Yet nationalism is 
simply the determination of a people to cultivate its own soul, to 
follow the customs bequeathed to it by its ancestors, to develop its 
traditions according to its own instincts. It is the national equivalent 
of the individual’s determination not to be a slave...Any discussion 
of these points was complicated by the tendency of these intellectuals 
to use the words ‘nationalism’ and ‘imperialism’ as if they meant the 
same thing...As the state of Europe grew worse innumerable people,




























































































most of them Americans sighed, ‘Ah it’s the fault of these small 
states,’ and had not the faintest idea what they meant when they said 
it.^
For West, Yugoslavia represented the fight against the Austro-Hungarian 
and Ottoman Empires and the liberation of national feeling. By adopting 
Yugoslavia she took a stand in favour of political movements against 
imperialism and she castigated the position of her contemporaries on the, left, 
while point out to the contradictions of western rationalism. Her itinerary 
through cities, communities, people, relations, friendships and animosities is 
rich in repetitions of all the stereotypical associations of Balkans with 
violence, irrationality, primordialism, scarcity and impediments to progress. 
This imagery however provides her with the language necessary in order to 
articulate a critique of imperialism and envisage an alternative European 
future. Not through dis-identification from the Balkans, but through visionary 
identification with the hypothetical European potential that the Balkans 
represented.
Case B:
Balkans, Europe and the American polity
American interest in the Balkans in the beginning of the century was 
triggered by two separate but interrelated events: World War I and 
immigration from Southeastern Europe to the United States.
During the first two decades of the twentieth century the issue of 
immigration of millions of labourers from the South-eastern peninsula of 
Europe to the United States was at the core of heated debates that concerned 
the content, the form and the future of American national culture and 
character.
Articulated either from the perspective of anti-immigrant nativism or from the 
perspective of cultural pluralism the arguments that were supported by policy­
makers, intellectuals, scientists and journalists concerned: the racial status of the 
new immigrants, the compatibility (or not) between their cultural heritage and 
the principles of proper American culture and the possibility of accommodating 
and integrating these immigrants in the native national body without altering its 
basic characteristics.
Both lines of argumentation used predominantly the concept-metaphors of 
‘Europe’ and ‘America’ (and not so much national terms) in order to define 
culture and difference, to elaborate on the appropriate ways that societies should 
deal with difference and to explain what happens at moments of encounter 9




























































































between culturally different (and possibly socially unequal) groups of people 
and traditions. Both lines of argumentation used the concepts of ‘Europe’ and 
‘America’ in order to discuss the need, possibility, form and governing 
principles of communities o f nations.
Thus, the American iconography of Europe in this period emerged as a 
response to the political, cultural and social need to talk about difference and 
identity in the context of cultural contact and interaction and demographic and 
social changes. Given the European cultural background of the dominant 
Anglo-Saxon American polity, the debates over immigration gave rise to a 
new iconography of Europe that illustrated the differences between South and 
North, Eastern and Western Europe. Accordingly, the nativist polemics of 
immigration argued that the South-eastern Peninsula of the Balkans and the 
immigrants who came from there embodied all the negative aspects of 
Europeanness and that their racial and cultural traits were radically different 
from those of the Anglo-Saxon Americans. According to the nativists any 
racial or cultural mixing between Southeastern Europeans and Anglo-Saxon 
Americans would constitute an act of miscegenation and would result in the 
creation of an inferior type of race and culture.
The advocates of nativism became politically dominant to the extent that 
they were actually effective in persuading the Congress to support legislation 
that drastically restricted immigration from the South and Southeastern Europe 
in 1924. Nativism however was politically confronted by different groups of 
social reformists and activists. Quite often the challengers of nativism were 
social reformists and workers who devoted their lives to work in the tenements 
and to the study of the conditions of the immigrants’ lives. In a sense social 
work was the origin of immigration studies as a field of scholarly inquiry. As 
opposed to the nativists and assimilationists who argued on the basis of the 
immigrant’s essential cultural characteristics, social reformers became 
interested in the historical and social background of the people who migrated 
prior to their immigration.
In the same period a number of American feminists who were devoted to the 
causes of internationalism and pacifism became interested in the possible 
influence of Balkan culture on American polity. This interest generated 
research in Balkan culture and history that aimed at providing a pluralistic 
response to the politically dominant assimilationist and nativist ideology.
A prominent representative of this group of social reformers was Emily 
G'reene-Balch. Balch visited the Balkans in the early 1900s in order to do 
research and collect material for a book on Slavic immigration to the United 
States. She was one of the first scholars of immigration who realised that it is 
impossible to study immigration solely from the point of view of the country 
that receives immigrants. She acknowledged the need to study the cultural, 




























































































reach to a conclusion concerning their possible impact on American polity. 
Thus the perspective of her research remained American-centric.
Balch did extensive research and collected material that she analysed in her 
over one thousands pages book Our Slavic Fellow Citizens.10 In order to 
respond to the question of how possible it was to assimilate Slav immigrants 
into American culture, Balch considered it necessary to analyse the type of 
Slav nationality. With regard to this issue, she mentions:
Nationality in the Balkans is different from that in the west in the 
sense that it does not concern political union, but it rests upon union 
of blood, community of language, and community of culture and 
ideals.11
In general, the non-political and primal nature of Balkan nationalism was 
considered in this period a negative characteristic that placed the Balkans in a 
perpetual time-lag in relation to European modernity. However, from an 
American-centric point of view the non-political and primal nature of Balkan 
nationalism was a positive characteristic since it was conducive to political 
assimilation. Slav immigrants in the US should be expected to retain some 
elements of their national/ethnic background; that however should be in no 
conflict with their overall assimilation by the American polity, since their 
ethnic nationalism did not historically have a political character. Even Pan­
slavism was perceived by Balch as a movement towards spiritual and not 
political union. Writing before the years of the Balkan wars Balch commented 
on the peaceful character of Balkan culture. She wrote:
In any case it appears to be true that Slavic peoples have not been 
fitted to play a conspicuous part in the era of bloody struggle which 
Europe has passed through, during the feudal period and since. In 
spite of personal bravery which has made Slavs famous fighters, from 
the Polish Legion to the Cossacks of the Ukraine or the Croats of the 
military confines, they seem to lack some element of aggressiveness, 
something of the instinct to retaliate.12
Peacefulness was attributed to a version of historical inertia that according 
to Balch differentiated the Balkans from the rest of the Europe and could be 
attributed to their Byzantine heritage. She noted:
10 Emily Greene Balch, Our Slavic Fellow Citizens, New York, Amo Press, 1969.
11 Ibid., p. 10.




























































































They appear to be deficient in the faculty for cohesion and 
leadership... The inclusion of the major part of the Slavs in the 
eastern sphere of influence had political and literary as well as 
religious results. Byzantium as a centre of the world of ideas meant 
something very different from Rome; something much less vitalising 
and significant for the future.13
The inclusion in the Byzantine Empire followed by the submission to 
Ottoman control had eliminated the notion of progress from Slavic history.14 
The inability to change, a feature that refuted the Europeanness of the Balkans 
and for US nativists proved the fact that the Balkans represented the dark side 
of Europe, was for Balch a positive characteristic that could render Balkan 
immigrants to the US into model American citizens. Historically separated 
from the stream of European modernity because of their Byzantine and 
Ottoman predicament, the Balkans were re-entering the process of progress 
via migration to the United States. America constituted the only historically 
possible future for the Balkans. In a note that echoes rather late twentieth 
century discourse on globalisation, Balch commented on the ways in which 
through immigration the Balkans would get the opportunity to re-join the 
world.
The change is under way, and the emigration to America is one of 
its accompaniments. It is also in turn an accelerating cause of the 
changes. Immigration is thus a part of that great levelling and fusing 
activity which is one side of the historical process. It owes its ease if 
not its possibility to the cheapness and speed of modem 
transportation and communication, and it co-operates with them in 
wiping out local differences, spreading among distant peoples the 
reciprocal knowledge of one another, and evening up their levels. As 
Tarde has said, civilisation of the prevailing type is becoming 
planetary; it has gone round the globe and come back again.15
Closely related to her life-long support to internationalism Balch favoured 
the elaboration of hybrid civic ideals that would guarantee the conflict-free 
co-operation between groups of people, ethnicity, races and nations without 
necessary melting them together or assimilating them to a dominant type. 
Their Balkan historical and cultural background -  so distinct and different 
from the European background -  rendered the Slav immigrants into model
13 Ibid., pp. 21-22.
14 Ibid., p. 23.




























































































American “fellow citizens”, true embodiments of the ideals of cultural and 
political pluralism that Balch supported.
The outbreak of the Balkan Wars (1912-13) that operated as a prelude to 
the European Great War surprisingly did not alter the perception of Balkan 
forms of nationhood as exemplary forms of ethnic consciousness in the 
context of pluralistic visions of the American polity. For American nativists 
the war proved the fact that European immigrants were not at all assimilated 
and that the famous ‘melting pot’ had obviously malfunctioned for decades. 
According to them the vigorous nationalist and cultural mobilisations of 
Bohemians, Greeks, Croats, Serbs, Macedonians during the War only proved 
the failure of Americanisation and the possible threat that these unassimilated 
foreigners could pose for American national unity. This type of argumentation 
was confronted by intellectuals who attempted to re-conceptualise America as 
a transnational state. One of the first advocates of transnationalism was 
Randolph S. Bourne.
Bourne was bom in New Jersey in 1886 and grew up in a social 
environment marked by industrial unrest and conflicts between native-born 
Americans and new immigrants. He studied at Columbia University and his 
teachers there included John Dewey, economic historian Charles Beard and 
anthropologist Franz Boas. During World War I Bourne wrote extensively on 
the war, he became the intellectual hero of WWI. The unifying theme of his 
articles was his refusal to see the war as a necessary step towards a safer 
world and democracy. He was also critical of the League of Nations since he 
saw it as an impediment to change and a means of petrifying the status quo. 
His articles and reviews in that period reflect his long-range search for a 
trans-national culture that would offer a fertile soil for the cultivation of 
democratic ethics.
In one of his most famous essays titled ‘Transnational America” and 
published in the Atlantic Monthly in 1916 he harshly criticised those 
American publicists who blamed the resurgent ethnic nationalisms of 
Southeastern European immigrants for the failure of the American melting- 
pot. He mentioned that,
To face the fact that our aliens are already strong enough to take a 
share in the direction of their own destiny, and that the strong cultural 
movements represented by the foreign press, schools, and colonies 
are a challenge to our facile attempts, is not, however to admit failure 




























































































rather to urge us to an investigation of what Americanism may rightly 
mean.16
The type of Americanism envisioned by Bourne constituted a type of 
nationalism very different from the European type.
We have transplanted European modernity to our soil, without the 
spirit that inflames it and turns all its energy into mutual 
destruction... In a world which has dreamed of internationalism, we 
find that we have all unawares been building up the first international 
nation. The voices which have cried for a tight and jealous 
nationalism of a European pattern are failing...What we have 
achieved has been rather a cosmopolitan federation of national 
colonies, of foreign cultures, from whom the sting of devastating 
competition has been removed. America is already the world- 
federation in miniature.17
Of course Bourne did not specify the procedures through which the “sting 
of devastating competition” had been removed and was overly optimist with 
regard to the un-conflictual organisation of ethnic difference in the US. The 
only indication that he gave about the conditions under which his 
Transnational America would be realized concerns the way in which he 
considers the Southeastern European immigrants as the model representatives 
of Transnational Citizenship. For Boume, transnational movements and return 
migration from the US to primitive homelands and back does not only 
represent the essence of true Americanism, but also constitutes 
Americanism’s opportunity to expand beyond the physical borders of the 
American continent.
This migratory habit has been especially common with the 
unskilled labourers who have been pouring into the Untied States in 
the last dozen years from every country in southeastern Europe.
Many of them return to spend their earnings in their own country or 
to serve their country in war. But they return with an entirely new 
critical outlook and a sense of the superiority of American 
organisation to the primitive living around them. This continued 
passage to and fro has already raised the material standard of living in
16 Randloph Boume, Transnational America, in Carl Resek (ed.), War and the 
Intellectuals. Essays by Randolph S. Boume, 1915-1919, New York, Evaston and London: 





























































































many regions of these backward countries...America is educating 
these laggard peoples from the very bottom of society up, awakening 
vast masses to a newborn hope for the future. In the migratory Greek, 
therefore, we have not the parasitic alien, the doubtful American 
asset, but a symbol of that cosmopolitan interchange which is 
coming, in spite of all war and national exclusiveness.18
Here again the Balkans function as an anti-symbol of Europe, only with a 
positive undertone. In a period that proper Europe is locked in the strife of 
19th century nationalisms and war, the Balkans exactly because of their 
backwardness and primitive character are open to American transnationalism 
a new form of global political organization.
Towards a Post-Ottoman perspective
During the first decades of the twentieth century images of Europe 
produced by Europeans -  or produced by Americans in relation to the 
American polity -  played an important role in the elaboration of political 
visions aiming at social and cultural change and reform. These political 
visions often found their conceptual vocabulary through the imagining of 
regions beyond the symbolic borders of proper Europe; through the 
development of discourses on other regions. That is to say that the 
imagination that motivated and these political visions was heterochtone, it 
claimed its origin in the realm of the “elsewhere”.
Being at the center of international developments in the beginning of the 
century, the southeastern peninsula of Europe became a very significant 
“elsewhere”. The significance of this region was mainly due to geopolitics. 
Bearings the marks of its Ottoman and Byzantine imperial past the peninsula 
represented the site of foreign penetration, abduction and differentiation. 
Claiming independence from former Empires the peninsula enabled the re­
assertion of the European presence at least in the sphere of imagination. It was 
in this way that the southeastern peninsula of Europe was transformed -  often 
misnamed -  into the Balkans.
For political visionaries, Balkanism offered the conceptual vocabulary for 
the elaboration of alternative images of Europe -  both in the European as 
well as in the American sphere of politics and culture. Alternative images of 
Europe that borrowed the vocabulary of Balkanisms responded to the need to 
re-conceptualise society as diversity and the nation beyond imperialism.
We still need extensive research in order to map the intellectual, cultural 





























































































ways in which more often than not these discourses re-enforced what they set 
out to transform.
We also need more in-depth research in order to understand the ways in 
which Balkanism overruns the binaries that characterise modernist theories of 
culture and politics: tradition-progress, civilisation-barbarity, optimism- 
frustration, development-inertia, Christianity-Islam etc. and to relate it to 





























































































The iconography of the continents in the visual arts 
from the origins to the age of Tiepolo*
Ever since antiquity, the division of the earth into continents has 
been customary, and indeed taken for granted, as by Pliny for 
example: “Terrarum orbis universus in tres dividitur partes, Europam,
Asiam, Africam.”* 19
The pictorial representation of the parts of the earth is developed in 
accordance of this concept of the world, and it attains fixed form during the 
expansion of the Roman Empire. The official art of the Imperium Romanum 
favoured the depicting of subjugated cities, personified as female forms. The 
Emperor Hadrian, who set himself the goal of visiting every province of his 
Empire, had many of his coins ornamented with personifications of conquered 
territories.20 These ancient representations were already firmly committed to a 
political view that assumes European superiority. Significantly Rome or Italy 
personified the European continent.
Thus the basic characteristics of the parts of the earth, as they should be 
depicted, became a firm tradition in Roman art. The continents became 
formally dignified female personifications with attributes that are then 
adopted, in part, in modem representations, too, so for instance the elephant- 
head, ears of com and a scorpion for Africa. As regards content, the pictures 
of the continents are decisively marked by imperial and economic interests. 
Though the personifications of Africa and Asia are reproduced with great 
respect, they never attain the dignity of a figure of Roma or Italia. They are 
majestic representations of a continent, yet remain subordinate, paying their 
tribute to Rome.
The conception of the world as divided into three continents is preserved in 
the Middle Ages. The orbis tripartitus becomes a symbol of God’s creation or 
for the power of Christ. Little effort beyond this is made to analyse the picture 
of the world in the Middle Ages.
* This paper is based on my dissertation Studien zur Ikunographie der Erdteile in der 
Kunst des 16.-18. Jahrhunderts, München 1985.
19 Pliny the Elder, Plinii Secundi Naturalis Historiae, III, 1.




























































































In contrast, the modem allegories of the continents constitute one of the 
most important themes of Western art from the late 16th of the early 17lh 
century. As a result of the discovery of America, the number of the known 
continents was now raised to four, which fitted the prevailing conventions of 
art dealing with profane themes. For the number four was to some extent 
canonical for the earthly realm: for compass points, four elements, four times 
of the day, four seasons -  and four continents. As well as this, the number 
four suited the requirements of pictorial embellishments, especially in 
churches and palaces, where it now became the practice to decorate the four 
sides or comers of a ceiling, for instance, with these allegories. In this way the 
raising of the number of continents to four after the discovery of America, 
certainly facilitated the diffusion of the theme.
This is, however, only a superficial explanation of the growing importance 
of these allegories in European art. For it was not Columbus’ sensational 
discovery alone that caused this development, but European expansion and 
colonisation. The gradual realisation during the 16th century, that Columbus 
had discovered not a coastal strip of Asia, but a whole new part of the earth, 
heightened the European awareness not only of the existents of continents, but 
of the European superiority as well. For this reason artists began, 
independently of one another in various parts of Europe, to represent the 
continents anew.
As had the Romans in the Mediterranean so now the Europeans appeared 
all over the globe as conquerors. This victor-pose characterises most 
allegories of the parts of the earth. Only in Asia did European come across a 
power and a culture comparable to their own if not superior to it, yet in this 
region Europeans argued their primacy as the adherents of the only true 
religion, which set them apart from Islamic cultures. Africa and America, by 
contrast, were seen as the territories of savages needing to be civilised. Thus 
the modem representations the continents are like those of the ancient world, 
stamped from the beginning by European ethnocentricity, when indeed, not 
actually caused by this attitude. By emphasising their cultural superiority 
Europeans legitimised their invasions and glorified themselves at the same 
time. As in Hadrian’s Rome so in the European Baroque and Rococo the 
principal significance of allegories of the continents is the representation of 
world-wide power. That is, the newly won position of Europe as the World 
Power created a new theme in art.
From the outset Europe appears as queen as shown in Adriaen Collaerts 
engraving from 1585 (fig. 1), and as the site of religion as well as dominatrix 
of the arts, civilisation and navigation. The inscription of an engraving from 
the hand of Crispijn de Passe of the early 17th century mentions Athena- 
Minerva: “The nymph hands me the weapons of Pallas.” Indeed Europe is 




























































































but also war-like Minerva as can be clearly observed in the motive of 
Europe’s suit of armour. The creators of allegories of Europe could avail 
themselves the classical figure of Minerva or the regal personifications of 
cities or lands, characteristic attributes being easily applied. When it came to 
allegories from foreign continents however, the artists had to depend on 
information from pictures and texts -  a procedure I would like briefly to 
introduce through the example of the “mundus novus”.
The reports of the discoverers and travellers aroused great interest in the 
educated classes all over Europe, and were printed in many editions as 
individual works or in compilations as can be observed in Crispijn de Passe’s 
Allegory of America, created in the early 17th century (fig. 2), that is partly 
based on the engravings of Theodor de Bry’s series “America”.21 These early 
reports from the newly discovered regions beyond the ocean provided the 
relevant source that would permanently fix the image of America. The 
Caribbean where the first landings were effected determined the view of the 
Americas.22 Columbus’ and Vespucci’s inspired descriptions of the beauty of 
the country and the luxuriance of the vegetation spread rapidly all over 
Europe. In addition the discovery of gold, already mentioned by Columbus 
provoked an enhanced interest in the land and it’s inhabitants much more than 
it was the case with Africa for instance. Whereas reports from Africa 
frequently merely distinguished between the light-skinned Islamic North- 
Africans and the heathen black Central-Africans those from America 
provided detailed ethnographic observations. As well as the relatively 
superficial descriptions of the nakedness, colour, hair and weapons of the 
American Indians, we find reports about the tattooing customs and tribal 
structures. One essential and for Europeans extremely alienating factor was 
the cannibalism of some Indian peoples.23 Vespucci’s reports on this quite 
unemotively while Columbus likens cannibals to monsters.24 These 
doubtlessly cruel customs of some Amerindian peoples do not, however, 
provoke a blanket condemnation. On the contrary, there are a number of very
21 M. Boehme, Die grojlen Reisesammlungen des 16. Jahrhunderls, Strassburg 1904. The 
most important travel collections were those by Giovanni Ramusio (Venice, since 1550); 
Richard Hakluyt (London, since 1582) and Theodor de Bry (Frankfurt, since 1590).
22 Cf. the contributions by H. Honour in the exhibition catalogues: The New Golden Land, 
New York, 1975; Amérique vue par l'Europe, Paris, 1976; Mythen der Neuen Welt, Berlin, 
1982.
23 The most famous source to this phenomenon is the authentic record by Hans Staden, 
Wahrhaftige Historia und beschreibung eyner Landschaft der Wilden, Nacketen, 
Grimmigen, Menschenfresser Leuthen, Marburg 1557.
24 C. Jane, Selected Documents Illustrating the Four Voyages of Columbus, Liechtenstein 





























































































positive evaluations, deriving from the notion of the noble savage, as depicted 
for example by Jan Sadeler the Elder in 1581 (fig. 3). This attitude of a pure, 
just life-style lived in harmony with nature and untouched by any civilisation 
was already familiar from antiquity. A description from Sir Walter Raleigh is 
typical: “We found people most gentle, loving and faithful, void of all guile 
and treason, and such as lived after the manner of the Golden Age.”25
This attitude was based on literary witness that had determined the image 
of foreign peoples since Homer and Hesiod. The Europeans' highly developed 
culture, itself recognised as such, was contrasted with the “primitivism” of 
exotic peoples, the term implying an ascetic ideal as well as a life-style in 
harmony with nature and not socially conditioned.26
In opposition however to this attitude one finds the Spanish conquidadores 
in particular harshly condemning the American natives. A typical example of 
this is the report of Gonzalo Fernandez de Oviedo, official historiographer of 
the Spanish monarch: “But among the Indians from the areas that I visited 
there are, to my knowledge, a number of sodomites and many, who eat human 
flesh, worship idols, conduct human sacrifice and are extremely vicious. They 
are crude people utterly without compassion... they are rather like merciless 
beasts.”27 Both of these attitudes were to characterise the allegorical 
representation of the continent as can be observed in the works of Sadeler and 
de Passe.
Another idea that had its origin in the traditional attitude of expectancy vis- 
à-vis foreign regions was the idea of fabulous beasts as noticeable in the 
motive of a crowned and winged aspis-snake in de Passe’s allegory (fig. 2). 
Dragons in particular, repeatedly described by ancient and medieval 
cosmographers and travellers, were so firmly anchored in the European image 
of the world, that they were in fact “sighted” in the foreign continents. Real 
animals are described as well of course, iguanas, jaguars and the gaudy 
parrots. These reports provided an impression of a wide land with luxuriant 
vegetation inhabited by naked men and strange animals. In response to 
changes in the European Zeitgeist the vision of America varies between 
cannibalistic cruelty and paradise lyricism.
25 For the Noble Savage in antiquity see Homer, Mas, XIII, 3-5; Strabo, Geographica, VII, 
3-9; Vergil, Georgica, II, 349-383; A.O. Lovejoy and G. Boas, Primitivism and Related 
Ideas in Antiquity, New York, 1965. The quotation is taken from Walter Raleigh, The First 
Voyage Made to the Coasts o f America, in: Hakluyt, Vol. II, 731.
26 G. Pochât, Der Exotismus wàhrend des Mittelalters und der Renaissance, Uppsala 1970, 
p. 46.
27 G. Femândez de Oviedo, Historia y natura general de las Indiai, quoted after Mythen 
der Neuen Welt, Berlin 1982, 58. His work is analyzed by A. Pagden, European 




























































































Alongside with these detailed literary sources an iconographic vocabulary 
was developed that became steadily more concrete in the course of the 16lh 
century and provided the basic forms of the allegories. In cartography, which 
progressed in leaps and bounds with the voyages of discovery, the still 
unknown central regions of Africa and America offered space for 
illustrations: “So geographers in Africa maps, with savage pictures fill their 
gaps...” mocked the poet Jonathan Swift. This applied no less for the “terra 
incognita” of America where, even after the first wave of rapid discovery, it 
was mainly the coasts that were investigated in order to establish the extent of 
the continent. Apart from cartography, where the illustrations merely filled 
out lacunae, the spirit of inquiry into the parts of the earth created a growing 
need for graphic description, which was met by the development of the 
techniques of print-making. While the first travel-accounts were but sparsely 
illustrated, those from the second half of the 16th century were mostly 
provided with a series of engravings. In 1564 Jacques Le Moyne travelled to 
Florida. Theodor de Bry produced engravings on the basis of this 
Frenchman’s paintings and published them together with the artist’s report on 
1591.28 They convey a positive impression on the life of the American 
Indians and contain implications of the Golden Age together with the notion 
of the Noble Savage. The influence of these pictures was considerable, if one 
bears in mind that as late as in the middle of the 18* century Giambattista 
Tiepolo in creating his figure of America took his information from the 
engravings after Le Moyne.29 Thus during the 16th century a comprehensive 
exotic vocabulary was assembled that was available to artists from various 
sources. The information there contained about the continents, even that 
pertaining to the previously completely unknown so called New World was 
varied and often relatively accurate, though it concentrated mainly on the 
sensationally new in conformity to a European point of view. This attitude 
characterises the first allegorical pictures as well.
A compelling schema for the depiction of the theme was first provided in 
1603 by Cesare Ripa’s Iconologia, printed in Rome (figs. 4 and 5). The 
compilation of allegorical pictures, based on ancient as well on contemporary 
literary sources and models, is known to have become the most important 
work of reference on these matters for baroque artists. In Ripa’s version of the 
parts of the earth the discrepancy of presentation between the three older 
continents and America is particularly clear. Europe (fig. 4) is of course 
declared to be the highest ranking continent: “Europa e prima e principale 
parte del Mondo". In support of this Ripa cites Pliny who described Europe as
28 Th. de Bry, America, Vol. II, Frankfurt 1591.
29 M. Ashton, Allegory, Fact and Meaning in Giambattista Tiepolo's Four Continents in 




























































































the leading continent despite its small size.30 Form the numerous attributes 
listed in the text, only weapons, a horse, cornucopias, crowns and a tempietto 
are shown in the illustrative woodcut. The attributes drawn from art and 
science as presented by Ripa are omitted in the woodcut, while weapons and 
the militarily useful horse are inserted to illustrate military dominance: “II 
cavallo, le piu sorti d’armi [...] dimostrano che e stata sempre superiore a 
l’altre parti del mondo, ne l’armi.”31
One new motif in Ripa’s allegory of Europe is the temple, a model of a 
church that the personification presents to the spectator in the way saints or 
founders usually do. Notwithstanding the classical form of the circular temple 
it is intended as a Christian church, as Ripa’s text makes clear: “Si 
rappresenta che tenghi con la destra mano il tempio, per dinotare ch’in lei al 
presente ci e la perfetta, & verissima Religione, & superiore a tutte l’altre.” 32
Thus Ripa considers the Christian religion as the decisive criterion for 
Europe’s leading role. This is shown by the presence, alongside secular 
crowns, of the tiara, the mitre and the cardinal’s hat at the foot of the 
personification. The other continents are contrasted with this picture of 
unchallenged hegemony.
Ripa’s picture of Asia is determined by contemporary sources whereby the 
attributes of the continent are represented principally by the much sought- 
after imports from Asia to Europe. The way she presents incense and spices 
remind, however, of the regions offering tributes to the Roman emperors. The 
allegory of Africa is almost wholly determined by the antique iconography. 
The Hadrianic coins, as noticed in the beginning, seem to have been 
particularly influential as the source of such attributes like the elephants-head, 
ears of com and scorpions. By contrast the allegory of America (fig. 5) 
summarises the peculiarities of the Indians as normally detailed in the travel- 
literature of the time. America should have a “volto terribile“, an instruction 
which very few artists were able to follow. She wears a fantastic, 
ethnographically inaccurate feather head-dress and carries a bow and an 
arrow. A human head pierced by an arrow represents cruelty and cannibalism. 
She is accompanied by a small alligator. Only the dress with its decoratively 
cut hem and embroided band reminds one of an illustration from Theodor de 
Bry’s America.33 The only figure of the series shown in motion is America, 
which, together with the arrow she waves in her hand, indicates the savagery 
of the young continent.
30 Pliny, Nat. Hist, III, 1; Cesare Ripa, Iconologia, Rom 1603; facs. New York and 
Hildesheim, 1970, p. 332.
31 Ripa, p. 334
32 Ripa, p. 333.





























































































In Ripa’s representations, which became almost obligatory commonplaces 
for the allegories of the continents the difficulties experienced on grasping 
which was foreign are plainly to be seen. We find that antique pictorial 
schemata for the representations of the continents are not extended to include 
America. The moving figure may, however, at first sight show some degree of 
relationship to the Amazons in ancient art -  witness the hair wound into a 
knot and the motif of the garment concealing only one breast, both quite 
contrary to Ripa’s indications. Yet a comparison with the other 
personifications shows that this Amazonian concept is at a far remove from 
the dignified representatives of a continent.
In this way fixed types and commonplaces developed which however did 
not stiffen into a formula, but provided the basis of various representational 
modes for the centuries to come. The new theme, which was integrated into 
the repertoire of Western art not without some difficulty, became one of the 
most important subjects of both profane and sacred art in the periods of 
Baroque and Rococo. The diffusion and popularity of the theme was no 
longer brought up only with the confrontation between Europe and the 
overseas continents and the process of the colonisation. Rather the 
representation of the continents served to express various European 
ideologies. The consequence of this development was that the allegories of 
the parts of the earth drifted ever further away from the reality of the 
continents. Not even in the beginning had they been pure didactic pictures, 
but constructions, filtered through the fantasies of discoverers as well as 
trough the criteria of the artists themselves. Once an iconographic canon has 
been consolidated, these allegorical images were further modified to suit 
Western visions and the original sources were hardly referred to any more. 
The decline of interest in the discoveries and the integration or even the 
subordination of the theme of the continents into programs dominated by 
different concepts brought about a flattening in ethnographical accuracy.34 
According to the demands made by the commissioner, chief prominence was 
given to political, religious or decorative exotic aspects to the subject. 
Ancillary figures or stock objects appear whose sole function is to produce an 
exotic effect. As the sensation of novelty wore off and the picture of the 
strange territories was delivered no longer by the visual arts by scientific 
compilations instead, the allegorical figures ended up by expressing mainly 
the fantasies of European rulers, religious orders or sentimental thinkers. The 
theme was no longer a means of expressing a world-vision but of expressing 
various philosophies of life.
By the time of Ripa’s allegory of Europe (fig. 4) at the latest, religion had 
become a criterion of evaluation. In the context of the profane images, the




























































































Christianity of Europe was set against the Islam that dominated in Asia, while 
Africa and America continued to be shown as heathen continents. But from 
the middle of the 17th century in the wake of the Counter-Reformation, the 
influence of Christianity became decisive in the now arising religious 
programmes. The concept of a “virginal” America was of prime importance in 
promoting a positive picture of the fourth continent and of its relationship to 
Europe. The papal claim to authority and the missionary zeal of the Jesuit 
order brought this aspect to the foreground. After the Counter Reformation 
the idea of a worldwide Christian community became most important for the 
Roman church. In accordance with Christ’s demand: “Go out into the entire 
world and preach the Good News to all creation” (Mark 16, 15) the apostles’ 
mission became once more one of the principal goals of the Catholic Church. 
In this sense the allegories of the continents became now in sacred art too an 
abbreviation for the whole mankind as “all creation".
Rome’s claim to religious world domination manifests itself also very 
prominently in Gian Lorenzo Bernini’s famous Fountain of the four rivers on 
the Piazza Navona.35 At the same time as the peace treaty of Westfalia, which 
was attacked by Pope Innocent X, was concluded, the pope commissioned 
Bernini to construct the monument. It was to be unveiled in the presence of 
the pilgrims in the Jubilee Year 1650. The sun symbol of the obelisk, 
reinterpreted as “lumen Christi” with the dove of peace on top, the heraldic 
symbol of Innocent X, is surrounded by the personifications of the principal 
rivers of the four continents. Their reactions bear the stamp of their religious 
allegiances. The light of Christ reaches all the parts of the earth but they do 
not all see it. While the Ganges and the Nile remain unmoved and turn away 
from the obelisk, the Danube and the Rio de la Plata turn towards it. The 
Danube, representing Christian Europe, supports the papal coat of arms and 
looks up the obelisk with its dove, while the Rio, seems, in contrast to the 
Danube blinded and thrown down like Saint Paul.36 America’s representative 
sees from heathen darkness the divine light breaking in and enacts by his 
gesture the victory of Christianity in the New World. The missionary 
character of the monument stands revealed.
This concept of bringing light to all parts of the world was repeatedly taken 
up. A prominent example is Andreas Pozzo’s famous ceiling fresco in the 
Jesuit church of Saint Ignatius of Loyola in Rome. The light which shines 
from Christ is actively transmitted out into the world by Saint Ignatius 
according to the painter and Jesuit father Pozzo: “Essendo egli stato 
zelatissimo di propagar la religione Cattolica, e la Luce dell’Evangelio per
33 R. Preimesberger, Obeliscus Pamphilius, in: Miinchner Jahrbuch der bildenden Kunst, 
1974.




























































































tutto il Mondo." 37 In a contrary movement, the process of salvation is made 
clear -  Jesuits from all parts of the earth ascend to heaven with the converted. 
In accordance with the engagement of the Jesuit order, Asia and America are 
the center of interest. Europe and Africa accept the ray of light quite calmly, 
Asia points out the Saint Francis Xavier among the blessed while America 
vigorously combats the infidels. The saint is glorified by the reverence shown 
to him by Asia, for he personifies the missionary zeal of the Jesuit order more 
than anyone else does. The America figure is distantly related to Ripa’s 
amazon but her aggressiveness has been transformed into a positive quality. 
Touched by the ray of light from Christ she combats the paganism in her 
continent. This concept, determined by the sense of mission was to spread out 
from Rome all over Europe.
These religious representations of the continents are also formally different 
from profane works and this in ways that once again reflect the special 
relation of Europe to America. The pictures, particularly those in important 
churches, do not always renounce exotic pomp even if this is less often 
present. But as the presentation of the exotic is not in the foreground, the 
allegories are concentrated on the essential elements of the traditional 
iconography, where novelty is not to be expected. Sacred art had, besides, no 
intention of rendering visible military or mercantile achievements and so, of 
accentuating European superiority in these realms. On the contrary it aimed at 
reducing differences in evaluation. It was almost exclusively in religious art 
that the distinction between civilised and uncivilised continents was 
transcended. Only very occasionally did America continue to be shown as a 
cruel cannibal. The idea of a worldwide catholic community ruled out the 
damming of the whole continent. Without significant distinctions Africa and 
America were received in the community of the converted, their 
personifications act like those of the other continents or are even emphasised 
as particularly zealous Christians. And in this process America undergoes an 
extraordinary transformation. If one recalls the bellicose man-eating Amazon 
of the 16th century, who then in Pozzo’s fresco becomes, inspired by Saint 
Ignatius, a champion of faith and then lastly, turns into a modestly clad 
maiden approaching Mary with folded hand as for example in Johann Baptist 
Zimmermann’s fresco of 1731 in Steinhausen or in the wide spread popular 
engravings like “Christ appears to the parts of the earth” that Bernard Picard 
created in 1718 (fig. 6), one sees clearly how profoundly the meaning of the 
figure has changed. In this work America seems less exotic and looks up to 
Christ in a way that is not at all aggressive. By the 18* century America had -  
in the eyes of the universal church -  lost it’s fearsome character. The godless
37 Andrea Pozzo, letter to the duke of Liechtenstein, 1694, ARSJ, FG 1345, quoted from 




























































































idolaters were promoted to the status of children of the “mater ecclesia” with 
almost equal rights.
In profane monumental art the allegories of the continents appeared, one 
might almost say as expected, in the court of Louis XIV, the sun king, in 
Versailles. In Charles le Bruns fresco in the stairwell, begun in 1674 and 
destroyed during a renovation in 1752, Fame and Gloria as well as historical 
paintings and allegories of the continents glorified the king. Thus the 
ambassadors, entering by this stairway saw a bust of the sun king together 
with the European and the American continents, where his territories lay.
This concept was repeatedly taken up in the second half of the 17th century. 
The allegories of the continents almost belonged to the standard program of 
castles and royal seats. They were used to decorate monumental stairwells, 
throne-rooms, conference chambers, festive knightly halls, anti chambers, 
guardrooms and castle gardens. They did not necessarily render visible the 
actual domination of territories as in the case of the French kings, but rather 
the claim to universal authority. In the time of colonial empires and 
absolutism the theme of the continents was widely diffused, especially in such 
imperialistic contexts. It was not only monarchs that considered themselves 
world-rulers. The princes of dwarf-states also saw themselves as integrated 
into a comprehensive conception of the world and had themselves painted 
accordingly.
To some extent it continued to be the real goal of the allegories of the 
continents to depict the hegemony of the own European continent, as can be 
seen in Tiepolo’s famous fresco in the Wurzburg residential palace as well 
(figs. 7 and 8).38 The inclusion of the inhabitants of foreign territories in the 
triumphal procession of a ruler goes back to antiquity and was given its fixed 
form in Rome. The ritual of displaying representatives of subjected peoples in 
a triumphal procession was taken up again, in modified form, in the 
renaissance.39 The subjects were no longer presented as manacled barbarians 
and slaves of triumphant Rome, but rather as people enjoying the benevolent 
rule of the good regent. In the following period it was no longer the individual 
peoples that were associated with the triumph of the ruler, but the 
personifications of the continents as a sign of worldwide authority -  even at 
Wuerzburg. The idea is the legitimisation of the ruler’s power through the 
excellency of his governance, which makes him world-famous. In this context 
Europe is accorded absolute priority as in Tiepolo’s fresco, painted from 
1149-1753.
38 Cf. exhibition catalogue Der Himmel auf Erden, München 1996.
39 J.M. Masson, Le monde luso-brésilien dans la joyeuse entrée de Rouen, in: J. Jacquot 




























































































The personification of Europe is a queen but appears also as the beloved of 
Jupiter from classical mythology, for a bull stands near her, adorned with 
flowers, which is an unusual feature (fig. 7). Typical, on the other hand, is the 
direct connection of the continent with the ruler, shown here with the building 
if the Wurzburg residence in the background. In the front of it the architect 
Baltasar Neumann is portrayed as artillery officer with cannon, besides him 
the stucco artist Antonio Bossi in a cloak, to the left Giambattista Tiepolo 
with his son Domenico.
Thus, Europe appears here as a guardian of culture. The three visual arts of 
architecture, sculpture and painting are introduced through their 
representatives at the court, Neumann, Bossi and Tiepolo and represented at 
the same time through works of art and allegory -  the painted architecture of 
Wurzburg, the real stucco sculptures on the sides and the allegory of painting, 
venerating Europe and as well as her, the princely bishop von Greiffenclau 
above. Europe’s cultural supremacy is then completed by the introduction of 
music in the motif of a concert. Only in second place, aspects of religion are 
recognisable in the Episcopal insignia. The previously so important aspects of 
military powers are here relegated to the background. An antiquated suit of 
armour lies in front of the globe that belongs to the figure of painting, behind 
we see an officer with the war-horse. Some military motives must however 
remain to symbolise the power of Europe. Above all the commissioner of the 
Work, Carl Philipp von Greiffenclau in a laurel-wreathed medallion. Fama 
broadcasts his fame to the admiring parts of the earth as patron of the arts and 
than as a guardian of Religion.
In the political allegory of absolutism the continents pronounced the 
highest dignity of the ruler who was equated with the sun shining upon the 
world. Christian Weise made a comparison very precisely in his work 
“Political orator” from 1681, saying: “Therefore let everyone say with full 
justification, that just as the sun in the sky, so is the loving and merciful 
prince in our fatherland.”40
These overarching programmes that repeatedly showed the prince as 
Apollo or a ruling family celebrated by Fama and accompanied by the virtues, 
increasingly took on a life of their own. It was after the international 
significance of the principalities was well past its zenith, that the theme 
attained its widest diffusion in the imperial context. Soon it was enough that 
one belonged the European nobility to emphasise one’s merits by means of 
the allegories of the continents that paid homage. What was required to this
40 Ch. Weise, Politischer Redner, Leipzig 1681, p. 766, quoted from F. Buettner, Die 




























































































end was no longer the accurate depiction of a continent but rather exotic 
splendour and above all homage and tribute.41
However, the Enlightenment brought a perceptible alteration to the view 
taken of the continents in the middle of the 18th century. Contemplating nature 
from the cosiness of a fireside, European thinkers yielded to a sentimental 
Utopia of a better World, in which the ancient myth of the Golden Age and 
the Noble Savage were revived and transformed to the continents, imagined 
as still being in the state of nature. Jean Jacques Rousseau and others 
described the noble savage in his original unspoilt condition and the demand 
“back to nature” had of course its effect on the representation of the “savage” 
continents Africa and America.42 Indeed this attitude is perceptible in 
Tiepolo’s portrayal of America in the Wurzburg palace (fig. 8). The 
personification of the continent, one of the artist’s most impressive creations, 
is an extremely dignified and self-conscious presence. She does not look up to 
the European ruler, but down upon her subjects, to whom she presents her 
extensive territory in its unspoilt state of nature. In the gigantic alligator she 
rides the old notion of the dragon in the foreign worlds returns to life. The 
majesty of the figure, the calmness of her gesture, the wealth of her country, 
represented by cornucopias and beasts and the untouched beauty of a 
magnificent natural scenery, all indicate the almost enthusiastic notion of a 
free mankind in a natural paradise, which is exactly the fantasy of the noble 
savage.
In the second half of the 18lh century the theme is taken up again by 
Tiepolo on a monumental scale, although with perceptible limitations. This is 
the beginning of the end. In 1762 to 1764 the painter portrayed the territories 
subjected to the Spanish crown in the throne room of the palace at Madrid. At 
a time, when the might of the country had long past its peak, the idea of a 
glorious and unchallenged Spanish monarchy was once again conjured up. An 
apotheosis of Spain is placed in the centre. Fama hovers above Hispania and 
bears her glory to the overseas continents of Africa and America. The picture 
includes further representations of the Spanish provinces.
In depicting Africa, Tiepolo in most parts picks up motifs from the 
Wurzburg fresco. For America however he abandons an allegorical depiction 
for an historical painting, choosing one of the most triumphant moments from 
Spanish history -  the return of Columbus (fig. 9). The discoverer is shown in 
the moment of landing. He gives the order for the treasures of the unknown 
continent to be unloaded. In this representation of a historical moment just as 
much emphasis is given to the Spanish crown’s encouragement of the
41 Poeschel, pp. 213-238.
42 J.J. Rousseau, Discours sur l'origine et les fondaments de l'inégalité parmi les hommes 




























































































discoverer as to the goods imported from the colony which lent Spain her 
wealth. The fact that Tiepolo confined himself to representing the areas that 
were actually under Spanish rule gave the picture greater credibility. This was 
the only way to present the country in the second half of the Eighteenth 
century as great and important to the eyes of the visitor entering the throne 
room.
The offering of goods, especially from America emphasises once again the 
tribute paid to the ruler in the original sense of the theme. America the 
“ultima pars mundi” without its own history is here accorded a place in 
European history. In Tiepolo’s fresco Columbus orders the Indians to unload 
the treasures of the continent. Yet despite the homage here paid to glorious 
Hispania, the reverse side of the coin is allowed to appear. The same Tiepolo 
who had in Wurzburg so brilliantly portrayed a free and proud America 
allows himself a sharp critical moment. The celebrated figure of an enslaved 
Indian hiding his face in his arms in a gesture of desperation, is scarcely a 
mere capriccio of a famous artist. Also in other places Tiepolo’s sympathy 
with the tragedy of the peoples conquered by Europe is made clear. In 
contrast of many other Rococo artist he never depicted Africans or Indians 
and clownish servants or smiling beauties. The glorification of the great 
Columbus is perceptibly disturbed by the despair of the anonymous and 
faceless “savage”. The figure remains only a detail in a triumphal program, 
yet it makes two fundamental changes clear. Here for once the element of 
cruelty that accompanied the allegory of America is shown as aggression not 
committed, but suffered. And it shows, besides, that the Spanish crown and so 
one of the most important ruling houses of Europe no longer receives 
unqualified reverence. The whole edifice of the European world power has 
hereby reached its limits.
The theme of the allegories of the continents evaporated with surprising 
abruptness just after its greatest diffusion towards the end of the eighteenth 
century. After the creation of the most triumphant frescoes, in which the 
continents had been pressed to personify in various ways, Europe’s 
worldwide authority, the end now suddenly came. The theme disappeared 
with the factors that had called it into existence. At the end of the eighteenth 
century Europe as world power was shaken. An annihilating blow was 
delivered from that very colony that Europe had “civilised", christianised and 
“pacified” -  namely America. The Declaration of Independence in 1776 
rocked a system of government that had been consolidated over centuries and 
which then came apart with the French revolution. The Jesuit order, whose 
goal had been the conversion of the savages, had already been dissolved in 
1773. Thus the bearers of the theme had become powerless. No ruler could 
any longer claim to worldwide fame. No nobleman would receive honours of 




























































































enlightenment, revolution and the secularisation of society could no longer 
claim to worldwide homage. The theme had lost its sense in European history 
and art. The continent was no longer supreme and could no more evoke its 
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